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INTRODUCTION
There is a growing tension between the foreign state immunity doctrine and
the right to court access.1 According to the foreign state immunity doctrine, a
state generally is immune from suit in another state’s courts.2 For example, the
doctrine ordinarily would protect France (or any of its political subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities) from suit in the courts of the United States.3 The
foreign state immunity doctrine emerged in the early nineteenth century and is
widely acknowledged to be a rule of customary international law.4 It is
typically justified on either the formal ground that, because states are equal and
independent sovereigns, one state cannot sit in judgment of another – as

1 This Article uses the term “state” in the international legal sense; that is, to refer to a
“country” such as the United States or Kenya rather than a U.S. state such as California or
Utah. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201
(1987) (“Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a
permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has
the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.”); BARRY E. CARTER ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 444 (5th ed. 2007) (“A ‘state’ in international law is what we
often refer to as a nation or country (such as the United States of America or Japan) and is
not one of the 50 U.S. states (such as California).”).
2 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property
art. 5, G.A. Res. 59/38, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/38, at 3 (Dec. 16, 2004) [hereinafter UN
Convention] (“A State enjoys immunity, in respect of itself and its property, from the
jurisdiction of the courts of another State subject to the provisions of the present
Convention.”). “State immunity” is sometimes called “sovereign immunity.” See, e.g., SEAN
D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 302 (2d ed. 2012) (using “state” and
“sovereign” immunity interchangeably).
3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (2006) (defining “foreign state” as including “a political
subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state”); id. § 1604
(providing that “a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States” except as otherwise provided).
4 See infra Part I.
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expressed by the maxim par in parem non habet imperium5 – or on the
functional ground that the doctrine facilitates foreign relations.6
But in the mid-twentieth century, a competing principle began to emerge:
the right to court access.7 According to this right, a person is entitled to access
to a fair hearing by an independent and impartial court for the determination of
a legal claim.8 Court access plays an important role in protecting rights,
compensating for injuries, implementing the rule of law, and facilitating the
peaceful and just resolution of disputes.9 As a result, the right to court access is
widely accepted.10 It is expressed in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
regional agreements such as the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights
and the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, and a growing number
of domestic constitutions.11 Even if its precise contours are not entirely settled,
the right to court access is increasingly recognized in both international and
domestic law.12
The problem is that the foreign state immunity doctrine can prohibit what
the right to court access requires: if a plaintiff sues a foreign state defendant in
a particular court, and the foreign state is immune from suit, then the court will
dismiss the plaintiff’s claim, denying her court access.13 Simply put, foreign
state immunity can “den[y] . . . a legal remedy in respect of what may be a
valid legal claim; as such, immunity is open to objection.”14

5 See HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 57 (2d ed. 2008) (defining “the maxim
par in parem non habet imperium [as] one sovereign State is not subject to the jurisdiction
of another State”).
6 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES ch. 5,
intro. note (1987) (justifying the doctrine as “necessary for the effective conduct of
international intercourse and the maintenance of friendly relations”).
7 See generally ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT (Francesco Francioni ed., 2007)
(documenting the emergence of an international and domestic right of individuals to court
access).
8 See, e.g., Francesco Francioni, The Rights of Access to Justice Under Customary
International Law, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT, supra note 7, at 1, 1 (defining
court access as “the possibility for the individual to bring a claim before a court and have a
court adjudicate it” and, more specifically, the right to have a claim “heard and adjudicated
in accordance with substantive standards of fairness and justice”).
9 See infra Part II.
10 See infra Part II.
11 See infra notes 90, 133-35, and Figure 1.
12 See Francioni, supra note 8, at 50 (arguing that foreign state immunity and court
access “both reflect norms of customary international law”).
13 See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 363 (1993) (dismissing a suit against
Saudi Arabia on foreign state immunity grounds).
14 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 109, at 342 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts
eds., 9th ed. 1996).
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To be clear, this is not merely an international legal problem. Even though
the foreign state immunity doctrine is a doctrine of international law, its impact
on court access is domestic. The doctrine can prohibit lawsuits from
proceeding in domestic courts, even if the forum state has compelling reasons
to permit a suit to proceed, and even if the plaintiff would have no alternative
recourse. For example, an Italian court allowed Italian plaintiffs to bring claims
against Germany for war crimes committed against them during the Second
World War.15 Germany then sued Italy in the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), arguing that the foreign state immunity doctrine prohibited Italy from
allowing the suit to proceed.16 In a 2012 decision, the ICJ ruled in Germany’s
favor, finding that Italy had violated international law by allowing access to its
courts for the plaintiffs’ claims against Germany and ordering Italy to ensure
that the decisions of its courts infringing on Germany’s immunity “cease to
have effect.”17
So far, international and regional courts have done more to exacerbate than
to mitigate the tension between the foreign state immunity doctrine and the
right to court access. Most notably, the ICJ’s decision in Germany v. Italy18
and the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECHR) 2001 decision in Al-Adsani
v. United Kingdom19 categorically prioritized foreign state immunity over the
right to court access, thus failing to shed light on how the two doctrines might
be reconciled and confirming that the foreign state immunity doctrine is indeed
a serious barrier to court access.20
This Article uses a combination of doctrinal and empirical analysis to
elucidate the tension between the foreign state immunity doctrine and the right
to court access, and it proposes a strategy for mitigating that tension. Part I lays
the foundation for the Article’s analysis by explaining the foreign state
immunity doctrine, and its origins, evolution, and justifications.
Part II examines the right to court access. It shows that the right is expressed
in a wide variety of public and private international law doctrines as well as a
15

Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, paras. 27-29 (Feb. 3,
2012), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16883.pdf (describing how the
Italian Court of Cassation allowed a claim against Germany on the ground that foreign state
immunity does not apply when “the act complained of constitutes an international crime”).
16 Id. para. 1 (explaining that Germany brought a suit alleging that Italy “‘failed to
respect the jurisdictional immunity which . . . Germany enjoys under international law’”).
17 Id. para. 139.
18 Id. (holding that the foreign state immunity doctrine did not allow a claim in an Italian
court against Germany).
19 Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 103 (“The Court, while
noting the growing recognition of the overriding importance of the prohibition of torture,
does not accordingly find it established that there is yet acceptance in international law of
the proposition that States are not entitled to immunity in respect of civil claims for damages
for alleged torture committed outside the forum State.”).
20 See infra Part IV.A (critiquing these decisions from a court access perspective and
explaining why their prioritization of foreign state immunity is categorical).
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growing number of domestic constitutions, and it identifies international legal
instruments that contain an express right to court access. Although some
scholars argue that there is a general international legal right to court access,
Part II’s central point is more modest: the right to court access, whether or not
it has become a legally binding rule of international law, is widely accepted
and increasingly legalized. Therefore, one important criterion for normative
evaluation of the foreign state immunity doctrine is its impact on court access.
Part III responds to this normative concern by systematically assessing the
impact of the foreign state immunity doctrine on court access. If a plaintiff
sues a defendant in a particular court, and the court dismisses the suit on
foreign state-immunity grounds, the plaintiff is denied access to that court. But
beyond this truism, the court access consequences of foreign state immunity
are poorly understood. For example, some commentators suggest that the
doctrine does no more than deny access to a particular court;21 but this
Article’s analysis demonstrates that this view underestimates the doctrine’s
court access consequences because the doctrine can preclude court access in all
states other than the foreign state itself.22 Other commentators suggest that,
when granted, foreign state immunity precludes court access altogether;23 but
this Article shows that this view overestimates the doctrine’s court access
consequences because another state, perhaps including the foreign state itself,
may provide a suitable alternative forum.24
Part III uncovers the court access consequences of the foreign state
immunity doctrine. First, it shows that when the foreign state immunity
doctrine applies, court access may be denied not only in the forum state, but
also in third states and the foreign state, thus potentially precluding court
access altogether.25 Second, it uses statistical analysis of an original dataset of
more than 350 foreign state immunity decisions by U.S. district court judges to
shed light on how the court access consequences of the foreign state immunity
doctrine play out in real-world litigation. The results confirm that the impact of
foreign state immunity on court access is real, not merely theoretical. U.S.
district courts frequently deny court access on foreign state immunity grounds;
both foreign nationals and U.S. nationals, and both individuals and businesses,
are affected; and the likelihood of meaningful court access in the foreign state
is often low when court access is denied in the United States.26

21 See, e.g., FOX, supra note 5, at 74 (arguing that the doctrine “does not confer impunity;
the underlying accountability or substantive responsibility for the matters alleged in a claim
remain; immunity merely bars the adjudication of that claim in a particular court”).
22 See infra Part III.
23 See, e.g., OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 14, § 109, at 342 (“The grant
of immunity from suit amounts in effect to a denial of a legal remedy in respect of what may
be a valid legal claim; as such, immunity is open to objection.”).
24 See infra Part III.
25 See infra Part III.A.
26 See infra Part III.B.
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In light of Part III’s findings, Part IV develops a strategy for mitigating the
impact of the foreign state immunity doctrine on court access. It critically
evaluates both the status quo and various previously proposed alternatives to
the status quo, such as the elimination or radical curtailment of the foreign
state immunity doctrine. It then argues in favor of a more balanced solution: a
proportionality approach. Under this approach, foreign state immunity should
not be granted if its impact on the claimant’s ability to obtain court access
would be disproportionate to the benefits of immunity for relations between the
forum state and the foreign state. This solution has the advantage of taking
seriously both the functional justifications for the foreign state immunity
doctrine and the importance of court access. Given the stickiness of customary
international law, a long-term evolutionary strategy would be needed to
implement this or similar solutions, supported by advocacy efforts aimed at
promoting the right to court access and advancing its legalization.
I.

THE FOREIGN STATE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

According to the foreign state immunity doctrine, a state generally is
immune from suit in another state’s courts.27 To lay the foundations for this
Article’s doctrinal, empirical, and normative analysis, this Part explains the
doctrine’s origins, evolution, and justifications.
A.

Origins

As early as the sixteenth century, international legal scholars recognized the
personal immunity of individual sovereigns, such as kings and queens, as well
the immunity of ambassadors.28 But it was not until the nineteenth century,
after the appearance of the modern nation-state, that the foreign state immunity
doctrine emerged, recognizing the immunity of states as distinct entities.29
27

See UN Convention, supra note 2, art. 5 (“A State enjoys immunity, in respect of itself
and its property, from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State subject to the provisions
of the present Convention.”). Foreign state immunity is the immunity of a state as a distinct
entity and is different from head of state immunity, diplomatic immunity, consular
immunity, and foreign official immunity. See MURPHY, supra note 2, at 295-302
(distinguishing these different types of immunity). This Article addresses only foreign state
immunity.
28 See GAMAL MOURSI BADR, STATE IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW
9 (1984) (describing sixteenth-, seventeenth-, and eighteenth-century writers – including
Gentili, Grotius, Bynkershoek, and Vattel – who acknowledged this form of immunity).
29 See id. (“[T]he rules of state immunity . . . have derived mainly from the judicial
practice of individual nations since the nineteenth century.”); MALCOM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 698 (6th ed. 2008) (linking the emergence of foreign state immunity to
the replacement of the personal sovereign with the abstract concept of the state). Although
sometimes confused, the law governing the immunity of individual sovereigns,
ambassadors, and other foreign officials is distinct from the law governing the immunity of
foreign states. See Ian Sinclair, The Law of Sovereign Immunity: Recent Developments, 167
RECUEIL DES COURS 113, 197-99 (1980) (Neth.) (clarifying the distinction between personal
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Domestic courts played the leading role in the development of the foreign
state immunity doctrine.30 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, a case
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1812, is widely cited as the seminal
statement of the doctrine.31 The claimants alleged that in December 1810
French naval forces had illegally taken their ship, the Exchange, during a
voyage from the United States to Spain.32 In July 1811, the ship – now armed
and under French command – entered the port of Philadelphia, apparently to
take refuge from severe weather.33 The claimants then filed a libel claim
against the ship in the district court in Philadelphia, which ordered the ship
arrested and detained pending the determination of its rightful owners.34 As
requested in a suggestion filed with the court by the executive branch of the
United States, the district court dismissed the claim on the ground that “a
public armed vessel of a foreign sovereign, in amity with our government, is
not subject to the ordinary judicial tribunals of the country, so far as regards
the question of title, by which such sovereign claims to hold the vessel.”35 The
court of appeals reversed.36
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the district
court’s decision, holding that as a “public armed ship, in the service of a
foreign sovereign, with whom the government of the United States is at
peace,” the Exchange should be “exempt from the jurisdiction of the
country.”37 As the Supreme Court put it, the issue was “whether an American
citizen can assert, in an American court, a title to an armed national vessel,
found within the waters of the United States.”38 The Court, in an opinion
written by Chief Justice Marshall, held that the claim was barred.39
Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning required him to resolve a tension
between two attributes of state sovereignty: the exclusive territorial jurisdiction
of states and the legal equality of states.40 On the one hand, Chief Justice
sovereign immunity and state immunity).
30 See BADR, supra note 28, at 9 (“[M]unicipal [that is, domestic] courts took the lead in
creating the rules of state immunity.”).
31 The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); see, e.g., BADR,
supra note 28, at 9-10 (explaining that The Schooner Exchange was the first decision to
articulate the doctrine); Sinclair, supra note 29, at 122 (“Chief Justice Marshall in The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon is regularly cited as the first judicial expression of the
doctrine of absolute immunity.”).
32 The Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 117.
33 Id. at 118.
34 Id. at 117.
35 Id. at 120.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 147.
38 Id. at 135.
39 Id. at 147.
40 See Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the
Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741, 745 (2003) (“The doctrine of foreign
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Marshall explained, “[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is
necessarily exclusive and absolute. . . . Any restriction upon it, deriving
validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty
to the extent of the restriction . . . .”41 Under this principle, a U.S. court would
have jurisdiction over the vessel because the vessel was within U.S. territory.
On the other hand, because of the “perfect equality and absolute independence
of sovereigns,” “[o]ne sovereign . . . [is] in no respect amenable to another”
and is “bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity
of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction
of another.”42 This principle would suggest that a U.S. court could not assert
jurisdiction over the vessel.
The Court reconciled these two aspects of sovereignty using a theory of
consent. A state may, by express or implied consent, agree to limit the exercise
of its territorial jurisdiction.43 In fact, states have consented to certain such
limitations by exempting from jurisdiction personal sovereigns, foreign
ministers, foreign troops granted free passage, and, most important for this
case, foreign ships of war.44 Specifically, the Court held that “national ships of
war, entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception, are to be
considered as exempted by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction.”45
Emphasizing that the basis of immunity is the territorial state’s consent, the
Court stated that “[w]ithout doubt, the sovereign of the place is capable of
destroying this implication. He may claim and exercise jurisdiction either by
employing force, or by subjecting such vessels to the ordinary tribunals.”46
Beyond the observation that states have given their implied consent to such
limitations on their territorial jurisdiction, the Court suggested two reasons
why states have done so: to protect their sovereign equality and independence
and to foster mutually beneficial international relations.47 The Court also
state immunity was born out of tension between two important international law norms –
sovereign equality and exclusive territorial jurisdiction.” (footnote omitted)).
41 The Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 136.
42 Id. at 137.
43 See id. at 136 (asserting that a state’s exclusive and absolute territorial jurisdiction “is
susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself,” that “[a]ll exceptions, therefore, to the
full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the
consent of the nation itself,” and that “[t]his consent may be either express or implied”).
44 See id. at 137-40 (describing three instances – those involving foreign ministers,
foreign troops, and the foreign sovereign himself – in which the territorial state consents to
waive jurisdiction when a foreign entity enters the territory’s jurisdiction).
45 Id. at 145-46.
46 Id. at 146.
47 See id. at 137 (“This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and
this common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good
offices with each other, have given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is
understood to wave [sic] the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial
jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation.”); id. at 136 (stating
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acknowledged, but did not examine, other possible reasons for consent, namely
“the general inability of the judicial power to enforce its decisions in cases of
this description”; and the proposition “that the sovereign power of the nation is
alone competent to avenge wrongs committed by a sovereign, that the
questions to which such wrongs give birth are rather questions of policy than
of law, [and] that they are for diplomatic, rather than legal discussion.”48
B.

Evolution

Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the foreign state
immunity doctrine evolved in three ways.49 First, the doctrine’s scope evolved.
The standard account is that the foreign state immunity doctrine was, at its
origins, absolute: it provided immunity against all suits filed against a state in
another state’s courts.50 Some commentators challenge this view, arguing
instead that the doctrine was initially more limited.51 Chief Justice Marshall’s
reasoning in The Schooner Exchange provides some support for this alternative
view.52 But regardless of disagreement about the doctrine’s original scope,
that the “mutual benefit [that] is promoted by intercourse with each other” is a reason for
this consent).
48 Id. at 146.
49 For comparative overviews of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century judicial
development of the foreign state immunity doctrine, see BADR, supra note 28, at 9-34;
Sinclair, supra note 29, at 122-34.
50 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
ch. 5, intro. note (1987) (“Until the twentieth century, sovereign immunity from the
jurisdiction of foreign courts seemed to have no exceptions.”); ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 145 (2d ed. 2010) (“Originally, State immunity was absolute, and
remained so into modern times . . . .”). According to the doctrine of absolute immunity, “the
sovereign was completely immune from foreign jurisdiction in all cases regardless of
circumstances.” SHAW, supra note 29, at 701.
51 See, e.g., BADR, supra note 28, at 18-19 (arguing that “early decisions did distinguish .
. . between a foreign sovereign’s public acts on the one hand and his private acts on the
other, stating in no uncertain terms that the latter enjoyed no immunity from the jurisdiction
of local courts” and adding that “[t]he continued citation of those early decisions in support
of the absolute theory of state immunity is therefore a curious phenomenon, due perhaps to a
hasty perusal of those decisions or to second hand knowledge of them”); Michael Byers,
Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules: Customary International Law from an
Interdisciplinary Perspective, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 109, 169 (1995) (arguing that absolute
immunity was never an established rule and that “there was no rule regulating state
immunity from jurisdiction prior to restrictive immunity becoming a rule of customary
international law”); Caplan, supra note 40, at 753 (“[I]t is a myth that states ever enjoyed
absolute immunity from foreign jurisdiction.”).
52 See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 145 (“[T]here is a manifest distinction
between the private property of the person who happens to be a prince, and that military
force which supports the sovereign power, and maintains the dignity and independence of a
nation.”); see also Sinclair, supra note 29, at 122 (stating that The Schooner Exchange “is
regularly cited as the first judicial expression of the doctrine of absolute immunity,” but
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there seems to be general agreement that the absolute doctrine prevailed in the
early twentieth century, and that states thereafter increasingly rejected it in
favor of the so-called restrictive doctrine of foreign state immunity.53
According to the restrictive doctrine, a state is immune against claims arising
out of its public or sovereign acts (jure imperii), but not its private or
commercial acts (jure gestionis).54 The United States, for example, officially
adopted the restrictive doctrine in 1952.55 Today, the restrictive approach
predominates.56
Second, it is generally acknowledged that foreign state immunity has
become a rule of customary international law, primarily through the gradual
accumulation of state practice in the form of domestic court decisions and
domestic legislation.57 There is a view, held by some scholars and at least
implicitly reflected in the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, that foreign
state immunity is not a rule of international law, but rather a product of comity
granted by a state in its discretion to a foreign state.58 For example, Sir Hersch
arguing that “[i]t may be doubted whether the judgment necessarily carries with it this
implication”).
53 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
ch. 5, intro. note (1987) (“The restrictive principle of immunity spread rapidly after the
Second World War . . . .”).
54 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 327-28 (7th ed. 2008)
(explaining that the restrictive doctrine distinguishes “between acts of government, jure
imperii, and acts of a commercial nature, jure gestionis, denying immunity from jurisdiction
in the latter case”).
55 See Jack B. Tate, Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to
Foreign Governments, 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984, 985 (1952) (“[I]t will hereafter be the
Department’s policy to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the
consideration of requests of foreign governments for a grant of sovereign immunity.”).
56 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (2d ed. 2005) (“At present almost all
States embrace the doctrine of restrictive immunity. It would seem that only China and
some Latin American States still cling to the old doctrine of absolute immunity.” (citation
omitted)); SHAW, supra note 29, at 707 (“The majority of states now have tended to accept
the restrictive immunity doctrine . . . .”).
57 See FOX, supra note 5, at 13 (“That immunity is a rule of law is generally
acknowledged by States.”); id. at 20 (“[T]he identification of the customary international
rule [of immunity] has largely taken place in the practice of States within their national legal
orders.”). Oppenheim’s International Law makes a similar observation:
[T]he practice of states over a long period has established that foreign states enjoy a
degree of immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state. This practice
has consisted primarily of the application of the internal laws of states by judicial
decisions . . . . [Despite certain variations across states], state practice is sufficiently
established and generally consistent to allow the conclusion that . . . customary
international law admits a general rule, to which there are important exceptions, that
foreign states cannot be sued.
OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 14, § 109, at 342-43 (footnotes omitted).
58 See, e.g., Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 479 (2003) (stating that foreign
state immunity is “a gesture of comity between the United States and other sovereigns”);

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2383372

2013]

FOREIGN STATE IMMUNITY

2043

Lauterpacht argued that “there is . . . no rule of international law which obliges
states to grant jurisdictional immunity to other states” – although he
acknowledged that the view was “unorthodox” and “at variance with the view
almost uniformly expressed in textbooks.”59 Today, the view that foreign state
immunity is a rule of customary international law – having been adopted by the
International Law Commission and the International Court of Justice – is the
dominant, if not uncontested, view.60
Third, although there so far is no generally applicable treaty in force
governing foreign state immunity,61 there has been a move toward codification
– domestically, regionally, and internationally.62 Domestic codifications
include the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, the United
Kingdom State Immunity Act of 1978, the Canadian State Immunity Act of
1982, and the Australian Foreign States Immunities Act of 1985.63 Regionally,
the European Convention on State Immunity was opened for signature in 1972
and has been ratified by eight member states of the Council of Europe.64 And
Richard Garnett, Should Foreign State Immunity Be Abolished?, 20 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L.
175, 175 (1999) (“[I]t is now almost impossible to speak of a ‘customary international law’
of foreign state immunity given the divergences in state practice.”); see also The Schooner
Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135-36 (1812) (deriving immunity from
consent of forum state and determining issue of immunity to “conform to those principles of
national and municipal law by which it ought to be regulated”). The U.S. Congress,
however, has acknowledged the international legal status of the foreign state immunity
doctrine. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006) (“Under international law, states are not immune
from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned,
and their commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments
rendered against them in connection with their commercial activities.”).
59 H. Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 220, 228 (1951).
60 See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, [1980] 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 137, at 147, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (Part 2) (stating
that the foreign state immunity doctrine has been “adopted as a general rule of customary
international law solidly rooted in the current practice of States”); Jurisdictional Immunities
of the State, supra note 15, para. 56 (confirming the International Law Commission’s
conclusion that foreign state immunity is a rule of customary international law); id. para.
106 (“State immunity, where it exists, is a right of the foreign State.”); FOX, supra note 5, at
18 (“The practice of civil law courts and common law jurisdictions other than the United
States has been totally opposed to such a reduction of immunity as ‘a gesture of comity.’”).
61 See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS & PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE
IT 80 (1994) (“[F]or the moment there is no treaty of universal application.”).
62 For an analysis of codification efforts, see Sinclair, supra note 29, at 134-45; id. at
243-56.
63 BROWNLIE, supra note 54, at 328-30; see also Foreign State Immunities Act 1985 (Cth)
(Austl.); State Immunity Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. S-18 (Can.); State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33,
§§ 1-23 (Eng.); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1976).
64 See European Convention on State Immunity, opened for signature May 16, 1972,
E.T.S. No. 074. The ratifying states are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Luxembourg,
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in 2004, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the United Nations
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, which
was drafted by the International Law Commission (UN Convention).65
Fourteen states have ratified the UN Convention, but it has not yet entered into
force.66 Nevertheless, it is widely viewed as reflecting the customary
international law of foreign state immunity.67
The UN Convention states the general principle that “[a] State enjoys
immunity, in respect of itself and its property, from the jurisdiction of the
courts of another State.”68 A state is to give effect to this general principle “by
refraining from exercising jurisdiction in a proceeding before its courts against
another State and to that end shall ensure that its courts determine on their own
initiative that the immunity of that other State . . . is respected.”69 Reflecting
the restrictive approach to foreign state immunity, the UN Convention provides
that states may not invoke immunity in certain types of suits, including those
arising out of commercial transactions.70
C.

Justifications

As noted by one international law expert, “[T]he grounds advanced in
support of [the foreign state immunity] doctrine are many and varied, and . . .
there is no unanimity of view on what is [its] true rationale . . . .”71
Nevertheless, the justifications advanced for the doctrine fall into two basic
categories: formal and functional.
1.

Formal Justifications

According to formal justifications, the foreign state immunity doctrine is
derived logically from other legal principles. For example, the doctrine is often
the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Id.
65 UN Convention, supra note 2, at 1.
66 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,
UN TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_
no=III-13&chapter=3&lang=en (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).
67 See FOX, supra note 5, at 4 (arguing that the UN Convention “would seem to establish
an international standard – a source of customary law and an agreed framework for
international law making . . . for the treatment of immunity by individual national legal
systems and their courts”).
68 UN Convention, supra note 2, art. 5.
69 Id. art. 6.
70 See id. art. 10 (“If a State engages in a commercial transaction with a foreign natural or
juridical person and, by virtue of the applicable rules of private international law,
differences relating to the commercial transaction fall within the jurisdiction of a court of
another State, the State cannot invoke immunity from that jurisdiction in a proceeding
arising out of that commercial transaction.”); id. art. 11-17 (setting forth additional
exceptions relating to, among other things, employment contracts, intellectual property, and
ships).
71 Sinclair, supra note 29, at 197 (emphasis omitted).
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said to follow from two attributes of state sovereignty: legal equality and
independence.72 Specifically, the principles of equality and independence are
said to preclude one state from exercising authority over another, including
through its courts.73 This justification is expressed in the maxim par in parem
non habet imperium – “[a]n equal has no dominion over an equal.”74 Closely
related justifications are that foreign state immunity is required to protect the
dignity of states, which would be offended if they were subject to suit in
domestic courts,75 or to abide by the international legal principle of
nonintervention in the internal affairs of states.76
The foreign state immunity doctrine is also formally justified by reference to
other types of immunity. For example, foreign state immunity is said to follow
by analogy from the immunity of a state from suit in its own courts77 or from

72 See generally OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 14, § 109, at 341-42
(describing the justifications of foreign state immunity as deduced “from the principle of
equality [and] also from the principles of independence”).
73 See BADR, supra note 28, at 89 (“The origin of the absolute theory of state immunity is
usually traced to the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. It has been convincingly
shown that law-trained minds are acutely vulnerable to maxims, especially those in Latin.”);
J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 243 (6th ed. 1963) (arguing that the foreign state
immunity doctrine is “a consequence of the absolute independence of every sovereign
authority and of the international comity which induces every sovereign State to respect the
independence and dignity of every other sovereign State” (quoting The Parlement Belge,
(1880) 5 P.D. 197, 197 (Eng.)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); FOX, supra note 5, at
57-59 (“Independence provides a justification for the absolute rule of immunity.”);
Sompong Sucharitkul, Immunities of Foreign States Before National Authorities, 149
RECUEIL DES COURS 87, 117 (1976) (Neth.) (arguing that the concept of sovereignty, which
includes notions of independence, equality, and dignity of states, provides “a firm
international legal basis” for immunity); id. at 119 (“Ce principe primordial du droit
international public qui proclame toute les nations également soveraines, indépendentes, et
par suite sans juridiction les unes à l’égard des autres, puisque la juridiction suppose la
subordination et non point la parfait égalité.” (quoting Tribunal de Première [Tribunal of
First Instance] Antwerpen, Nov. 11, 1876, PAS. 1877, III, 28 (Belg.) (internal quotation
marks omitted), translated in Erik Suy, Immunity of States Before Belgian Courts and
Tribunals, 27 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 660, 665
(1967) (Ger.)).
74 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1004 (5th ed. 1979).
75 See BADR, supra note 28, at 79 (observing that “[t]raditionally, the sovereignty or the
admittedly vague notion of the ‘dignity’ of the foreign state have been invoked” to explain
foreign state immunity); Sucharitkul, supra note 73, at 119 (describing the link made
between foreign state immunity and “the international comity which induces every
sovereign State to respect the . . . dignity of every other sovereign state” (quoting The
Parlement Belge, 5 P.D. at 197) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
76 See BROWNLIE, supra note 54, at 325 (stating that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
comports with the accepted rule that states do “not purport to exercise jurisdiction over the
internal affairs of any other independent state”).
77 See FOX, supra note 5, at 59 (clarifying that foreign state immunity “has been justified

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2383372

2046

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:2033

the doctrine of diplomatic immunity: “If ambassadors [have] diplomatic
immunities in their capacity as representatives of foreign States . . . , a fortiori
the States . . . they represent should be entitled to no lesser degree of
immunities.”78
2.

Functional Justifications

Functional justifications for the foreign state immunity doctrine rest on the
doctrine’s intended practical consequences. Implicit in these justifications is
the attitude that regardless of formal justifications, “[t]here seems little point in
rules of State immunity unless they are supported by convincing reasons of
policy.”79
The overarching functional justification for the foreign state immunity
doctrine is that it facilitates the conduct of relations between the forum state
and the foreign state.80 This justification can be traced to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s opinion in The Schooner Exchange, which linked the doctrine to the
“mutual benefit” of states that “is promoted by intercourse with each other.”81

by analogy, either by reference to its immune position under its own home law, or by
reference to the protected position of the forum State under its national laws”); Sucharitkul,
supra note 73, at 115 (describing foreign state immunity as “a direct inheritance” of the
“archaic practice” of domestic state immunity).
78 See Suchartikul, supra note 73, at 116 (“The precedent of diplomatic immunities may
be said to have given an added reason for State immunities.”).
79 FOX, supra note 5, at 55.
80 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States – A Proposal for Reform of
United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 901, 913 (1969) (“[T]he grant of sovereign immunity
is designed to facilitate relations between foreign states by relieving the sovereign from the
indignity of being subjected to a domestic adjudication.”); see also Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 60, at 156
(“[C]onsiderations of friendly and co-operative international relations have sometimes been
advanced as subsidiary or additional reasons for recognition of State immunity.”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW ch. 5, pt. A, intro. note (1987)
(explaining that the doctrine has been justified as “necessary for the effective conduct of
international intercourse and the maintenance of friendly relations”); ERNEST K. BANKAS,
THE STATE IMMUNITY CONTROVERSY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (2005) (stating that the
foreign state immunity doctrine “is consonant with the quest for promoting peaceful and
mutual intercourse among states”); FOX, supra note 5, at 751 (arguing that the foreign state
immunity doctrine serves “as a holding device by which confrontation between States is
avoided”); Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the “Sovereign” out of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity Exception, 17 YALE J.
INT’L L. 489, 521 (1992) (arguing that the foreign state immunity doctrine mitigates “the
foreign policy risk of the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction” over a foreign state); Jasper Finke,
Sovereign Immunity: Rule, Comity or Something Else?, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 853, 853-54
(explaining that one justification for sovereign immunity is “the indispensable importance of
upholding sovereign immunity for maintaining good and peaceful relations among states”).
81 The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
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There are various reasons why the foreign state immunity doctrine may
facilitate the conduct of foreign relations. These reasons are sometimes
advanced as subsidiary functional justifications for the doctrine. For example,
the foreign state immunity doctrine is said to protect the governmental
functions of the foreign state from interference by the forum state’s courts, thus
avoiding objections or retaliation by the foreign state that could disrupt
relations between the two states.82 In particular, the doctrine is said to avoid the
occasion for the enforcement of a forum state judgment against the foreign
state, which can be an especially acute form of interference.83 If the forum state
avoids interference with a foreign state’s governmental functions, the foreign
state may reciprocate by avoiding interference with the forum state’s
governmental functions. The doctrine is also said to avoid judicial branch
decisions that may be at odds with executive branch foreign policy.84 But
essentially the functional justifications for the foreign state immunity doctrine
boil down to the doctrine’s supposed positive effect on relations between the
forum state and the foreign state.85
82

See Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria Gen. de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336
F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964) (observing the “interest of foreign governments in being free to
perform certain political acts without undergoing the embarrassment or hindrance of
defending the propriety of such acts before foreign courts”); BROWNLIE, supra note 54, at
326 (explaining that one rationale for the foreign state immunity doctrine is “the functional
need to leave [states] unencumbered in the pursuit of their mission”); FOX, supra note 5, at
42 (“Immunity can be seen as a useful device . . . insulating the power to administer and to
operate the public service of one State from interference by another State and its courts.”);
id. at 58 (“Inherent in the recognition of the foreign State’s independence is an
acknowledgement that it alone is responsible for the determination of its policy and conduct
of its public administration, and that courts should refrain from hampering the foreign State
in the achievement of these purposes.”); Donoghue, supra note 80, at 518 (positing that
acceptance of foreign state immunity results from the “conviction that a court of one state
should not be permitted to exercise jurisdiction over another state if this would unduly
interfere with the functions of that state”).
83 See CASSESE, supra note 56, at 109 (“As execution is more penetrating hence more
intrusive into foreign sovereignty than jurisdiction, a tendency can be discerned in the case
law to be more generous with foreign States as far as immunity from execution is
concerned.”); FOX, supra note 5, at 56 (acknowledging the “impossibility, short of invasion
or war, of forcing a State to do what a court may order” and referring to this as “the
outstanding reason for the retention of immunity” and explaining that “the political
consequences to the friendly relations of the forum State with the foreign State may
discourage the forum State’s support for such enforcement”); Sucharitkul, supra note 73, at
121 (“Difficulties or impossibility of execution of judgments against foreign States have
been advanced as an argument for the local courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction.”).
84 See Victory Transp. Inc., 336 F.2d at 357 (“[S]overeign immunity has been retained . .
. to avoid possible embarrassment to those responsible for the conduct of the nation’s
foreign relations.”).
85 Cf. Caplan, supra note 40, at 777 (“[T]he sole raison d’être for state immunity under
customary international law is so that states can perform their public functions effectively
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THE RIGHT TO COURT ACCESS

According to the right to court access, a person generally is entitled to
access to a fair hearing by an independent and impartial court for the
determination of a legal claim.86 The right to court access is based on the
premise that courts play an important role in protecting rights, compensating
for injuries, implementing the rule of law, and facilitating the peaceful and just
resolution of disputes.87 As the U.S. Supreme Court has put it, the “right to sue
and defend in the courts” is a “fundamental principle[]” in organized societies,
one that is “conservative of all other rights” and “lies at the foundation of
orderly government.”88
Although some scholars argue that there is an international legal right to
court access,89 this Part’s central argument is more modest: the right to court
access, whether or not it has become a legally binding rule of international law,
is widely accepted and increasingly legalized.90 Therefore, one important
and ensure that international relations are conducted in an orderly fashion.”).
86 See Francioni, supra note 8, at 3 (describing access to justice as “the right to seek a
remedy before a court of law or a tribunal which is constituted by law and which can
guarantee independence and impartiality in the application of the law”). Francioni uses the
term “access to justice” to refer to this right. As Francioni acknowledges, however, this term
is often understood as entailing not only formal court access, but also “legal aid for the
needy, in the absence of which judicial remedies would be available only to those who
dispose of the financial resources necessary to meet the, often prohibitive, cost of lawyers
and the administration of justice.” Id. at 1. In this sense, “access to justice” is a broader
concept than “court access.” Moreover, if courts are not available and fair for a claimant,
court access may not be sufficient for justice; and, conversely, if alternative forms of dispute
resolution are available and fair, courts may not be necessary for justice. Id. at 3-5.
Therefore, this Article uses the narrower and more precise term “court access.”
87 See id. at 1 (“In international law, as in any domestic legal system, respect and
protection of human rights can be guaranteed only by the availability of effective judicial
remedies.”).
88 Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); see also David D.
Caron, The Independence and Impartiality of Legal Systems, 5 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION
REV. 255, 256 (2011) (“[T]he right to an independent and impartial judiciary to decide
claims of persons has been a critical component not only as the particular right in issue, but
also as the avenue by which all other rights are protected.”); cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right
of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”).
89 See, e.g., Francioni, supra note 8, at 42 (“[A]ccess to justice is a right recognized
under general international law . . . .”); Elena Sciso, Italian Judges’ Point of View on
Foreign States’ Immunity, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1201, 1212 (2011) (endorsing the
Italian position that there is a fundamental human right of access to justice “recognized by
international customary law as well as by universal and regional agreements on the issue”);
Jan Wouters et al., Belgian Court of Cassation, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 560, 567 (2011)
(acknowledging the view that the individual right of court access is customary international
law).
90 See, e.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 47, Dec. 18, 2000,
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criterion for normatively evaluating the foreign state immunity doctrine should
be its impact on court access. To establish this point, this Part surveys public
and private international law doctrines that express the right to court access, it
empirically documents the spread of the right to court access in domestic
constitutions, and it analyzes a variety of international legal instruments under
which court access is a legal right.
A.

Public International Law Doctrines

First, the right to court access is expressed in a variety of public
international law doctrines. For example, it is expressed in the customary
international law duty of a state to provide basic justice to foreigners injured
within its territory.91 A “denial of justice” occurs when a state violates that
duty.92 As one exhaustive study concludes, even if the precise scope of the
concept of denial of justice is not entirely settled, it clearly includes a state’s
refusal to allow foreigners to establish their rights before the state’s ordinary
courts.93 More specifically, “[d]enial of justice exists when there is a denial,
unwarranted delay or obstruction of access to courts, gross deficiency in the
administration of judicial or remedial process, failure to provide those
guarantees which are generally considered indispensable to the proper
administration of justice, or a manifestly unjust judgment.”94
The right to court access is also implicit in the customary international law
of diplomatic protection.95 Diplomatic protection is defined as follows:
2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 20 (providing the right to a “fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law”); Organization
of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 8(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 143, 147 (“Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within
a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously
established by law.”).
91 See JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2005) (arguing that
the duty of states “to provide decent justice to foreigners” is “one of [international law’s]
oldest principles”); see also Francioni, supra note 8, at 9 (describing the denial-of-justice
principle as a precursor to a more general right to court access, while emphasizing that the
right entailed in the concept of denial of justice is limited to the courts of “the state in whose
territory the alien has suffered the alleged injury” and does not provide a right to court
access in a third state).
92 See PAULSSON, supra note 91, at 62 (defining the customary international law concept
of “denial of justice” as a state’s “administ[ration] [of] justice to aliens in a fundamentally
unfair manner”).
93 Id. at 65 (referencing a study by Vattel, who proposed that not allowing foreigners to
establish rights before the ordinary courts comprised a denial of justice).
94 Harvard Research in Int’l Law, The Law of Responsibility of States for Damage Done
in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, 23 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 131, 134
(1929); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 54, at 529 (referring to the Harvard study as
probably “the best guide” to the concept’s meaning).
95 See generally Report of the International Law Commission, 58th Sess., May 1—June
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[T]he invocation by a State, through diplomatic action or other means of
peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of another State for an injury
caused by an internationally wrongful act of that State to a natural or legal
person that is a national of the former State with a view to the
implementation of such responsibility.96
As a general rule, a state may not present an international claim for its
national’s injury unless the national has exhausted the other state’s local
remedies.97 Exhaustion, however, is not required if it would be futile – for
example, if “[t]here are no reasonably available local remedies to provide
effective redress, or the local remedies provide no reasonable possibility of
such redress.”98 Among other things, exhaustion is typically said to be futile if
the local court would have no jurisdiction over the dispute in question or if
“the local courts are notoriously lacking in independence.”99 Thus, the doctrine
of diplomatic protection implicitly assumes that the state against which a claim
is made should provide court access for that claim, and if it does not,
exhaustion is not required.
B.

Private International Law Doctrines

In addition to being expressed in public international law doctrines such as
denial of justice and diplomatic protection, the right to court access is
expressed in private international law doctrines.100 For example, under the
doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity (forum necessitatis), “a court has
exceptional jurisdiction if justice so demands, even absent the usual
requirements, because no other forum is available to the plaintiff.”101 The
doctrine not only operates to provide court access that might not otherwise be
available, but also is sometimes justified as permitted, or even required, by a
legal right to court access or the international law prohibition of denial of
justice.102
9, July 3—Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/10; GAOR 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2006)
(adopting the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection).
96 Id. art. 1.
97 Id. art. 14(1) (“A State may not present an international claim in respect of an injury to
a national or other person referred to in draft article 8 before the injured person has, subject
to draft article 15, exhausted all local remedies.”).
98 Id. art. 15(a); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 54, at 495 (describing “certain
circumstances [in which] recourse to local remedies is excused”); PAULSSON, supra note 91,
at 114 (stating that exhaustion is not required if there are no effective local remedies to
exhaust).
99 Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 95, at 79.
100 See generally J. J. Fawcett, General Report, in DECLINING JURISDICTION IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (J. J. Fawcett ed., 1995).
101 Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1003, 1053-54
(2006).
102 ARNAUD NUYTS, GENERAL REPORT, STUDY ON RESIDUAL JURISDICTION (2007),
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In the United States, the doctrine’s status is debated.103 If it exists at all, it
would seem to exist as a factor for courts to weigh at the reasonableness stage
of the jurisdictional due process inquiry, with the lack of an available
alternative forum favoring jurisdiction.104 In other jurisdictions, the doctrine of
jurisdiction by necessity is recognized and, when applicable, it authorizes (but
does not require) a court to assert jurisdiction.105
According to one survey of the doctrine, jurisdiction by necessity is
typically subject to two conditions. First, “there must be some kind of obstacle
preventing the plaintiff from obtaining justice abroad.”106 The obstacle may be
legal (such as lack of jurisdiction or lack of a guarantee of a fair trial in other
courts) or factual (such as a threat to the plaintiff’s safety or disproportionate
costs of bringing suit in a legally available forum).107 Second, there must be a
available at http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_residual_jurisdiction_en.pdf
(commenting that the jurisdiction by necessity principle is, in some states, based on the right
to a fair trial and the prohibition of denial of justice); see also Benedetta Ubertazzi,
Intellectual Property Rights and Exclusive (Subject Matter) Jurisdiction: Between Private
and Public International Law, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 357, 388 (2011) (“In
general, the exercise of jurisdiction by necessity is conditioned upon two requirements: (1)
the case must have some connection to the forum State, and (2) it must be unreasonable to
bring proceedings abroad.”). For more on denial of justice, see supra Part II.A.
103 See PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.6, at 402 (5th ed. 2010) (“The
boundaries of this necessity doctrine, and whether it really exists, are the subject of some
considerable debate.”).
104 See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (enumerating
“the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief” as among the factors
that “sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing
of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). As one group of scholars put it:
[I]t remains difficult to discern whether jurisdiction by necessity is an independent
doctrine. It seems to be at least equally plausible that . . . the plaintiff’s inability to
reasonably carry out the litigation in another forum is a factor in the overall
‘reasonableness’ of asserting jurisdiction. If it is an independent doctrine, it is one
applied only sparingly . . . .
HAY ET AL., supra note 103, § 6.6, at 404.
105 See Fawcett, supra note 100, at 8 (providing a comparative overview of forum by
necessity in the Netherlands, Switzerland, Scandinavia, and Finland); see also NUYTS, supra
note 102, at 66 tbl.L (listing jurisdiction by necessity as a recognized ground of jurisdiction
in some European Union member states, including Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France,
Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Romania); Ubertazzi, supra
note 102, at 387-88 (listing jurisdiction by necessity as a recognized ground for jurisdiction
in Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland,
Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom).
106 NUYTS, supra note 102, at 64.
107 Id. at 65 (“[T]he forum necessitatis can be relied upon in two kinds of circumstances.
Firstly, when there is a legal obstacle . . . [and] [s]econdly, the plaintiff can also show that
he is confronted with factual obstacles.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2383372

2052

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:2033

connection between the forum and the suit.108 In some states, a specific
connection is required: the plaintiff must be a national or habitual resident of
the forum state.109 In most of the states surveyed, however, forum nationality
or habitual residence is sufficient, but not necessary, to satisfy the condition
that there be a connection between the suit and the forum.110
Although the forum non conveniens doctrine provides a basis for denying
court access in a specific forum, it too expresses an overarching concern with
court access. The forum non conveniens doctrine is a common law doctrine
that gives a court the discretion “to decline jurisdiction on the basis that the
appropriate forum for trial is abroad or that the local forum is inappropriate.”111
Typically, dismissal is not permitted on forum non conveniens grounds unless
there is an adequate alternative forum in which the plaintiff may pursue the
claim.112 For example, according to the U.S. version of the doctrine, before
dismissing a suit on forum non conveniens grounds, “the court must determine
whether there exists an alternative forum.”113 Although the doctrine may
permit denial of court access in a particular forum, the alternative forum
requirement embodies the principle that a forum non conveniens dismissal
should not deny the plaintiff court access altogether.114
C.

Domestic Constitutions

The right to court access is also widely recognized in domestic legal
systems.115 A major cross-national study concluded that the commitment to
108

Id. (“The second traditional condition of the forum necessitatis is that there must be
some kind of connection with the forum.”).
109 See id. at 66 (explaining that Austria requires such a connection).
110 Id. (“There is a general consensus that the required connection exists at least when the
plaintiff is domiciled or habitually resident in the forum State.”).
111 Fawcett, supra note 100, at 10. Jurisdictions with a forum non conveniens doctrine
include Great Britain, New Zealand, Canada, Israel, and the United States. Id.
112 See id. at 14-15 (“It is an essential requirement for declining jurisdiction on the basis
of forum non conveniens in Britain, other Commonwealth States, and the United States that
there is an alternative forum abroad.”).
113 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981).
114 See Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens
and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1454-62 (2011)
(arguing that the alternative forum requirement is “[t]o ensure that the plaintiff will have
court access somewhere and that the dismissal will not entirely deny the plaintiff access to
justice” but observing that in practice the adequacy standard applied to a putative alternative
forum is very lenient and therefore might not effectively ensure such access).
115 See Ubertazzi, supra note 102, at 408 (observing that “[t]he fundamental right of
access to courts is domestically established” in states including Austria, Finland, Germany,
Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Columbia, Japan, Mexico, Russia,
South Africa, Switzerland, and Turkey); cf. FOX, supra note 5, at 159 (“The rules of natural
justice in common law and the concept of denial of justice in civil law have long been
recognized as securing a litigant’s fair hearing of a complaint.”).
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access to justice increased in a series of three waves.116 In the first wave, states
made efforts to deliver legal services to the poor.117 In the second wave, efforts
were made “to extend representation to ‘diffuse interests’ such as those of
consumers and environmentalists.”118 And in the third wave, there was “a shift
in focus to dispute-processing institutions in general, rather than simply on
institutions of legal representation.”119 More recently, a comparative analysis
of domestic constitutions in Europe revealed a “trend towards ever more
detailed espousal of the access to justice concept in national constitutions” as
well as “on the supranational level of the European Union.”120
Globally, the percentage of constitutions providing court access rights has
increased since the Second World War. As Figure 1 shows, the percentage has
increased overall between 1946 and 2006.121 Although the percentage dropped
from 68% in 1946 and 1956 to 62% in 1976, it thereafter climbed steeply,
reaching 86% in 2006.122 As of 2006, court access provisions were the
eleventh most common constitutional provision in the world,123 contained in so
many constitutions that they can be said to form part of a “generic, global
practice of rights constitutionalism.”124

116 Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice and the Welfare State: An
Introduction, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE STATE 1 (Mauro Cappelletti ed.,
1981).
117 Id. at 4.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Eva Storskrubb & Jacques Ziller, Access to Justice in European Comparative Law, in
ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT, supra note 7, at 177, 187.
121 David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 773-75 tbl.1 (2012).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 774.
124 Id. at 773.
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Figure 1. Percentage of Constitutions with Court Access Rights, 1946-2006125

N=182

N=63

N=188

N=75

N=120

N=156
N=138

1946

1956

1966

1976
Year

1986

1996

2006

For example, under Section 34 of the South African Constitution,
“[e]veryone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.”126 Under
Article 32 of the Japanese Constitution, “[n]o person shall be denied the right
of access to the courts”127; and under Article 17, “[e]very person may sue for
redress as provided by law from the State or a public entity, in case he has
suffered damage through illegal act of any public official.”128
Although the precise constitutional language varies from state to state, these
provisions share the basic principle that persons generally have a right to court
access for the determination of legal claims. Moreover, beyond illustrating the
spread of court access rights in domestic law, the increase in the number of
constitutions containing court access rights may have international legal
significance: the trend might be considered evidence suggesting that the right

125

Figure 1 plots the percentage of the world’s constitutions with court access rights over
time. At each point, the figure also indicates the number of constitutions in the world in the
specified year. For example, N=63 for 1946 indicates that there were sixty-three
constitutions in 1946. For the source of the data represented in Figure 1, see id. at 773-75
tbl.1.
126 S. AFR. CONST., 1996.
127 NIHONOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 32.
128 Id. art. 17.
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to court access is emerging as a general principle of law, which is one
recognized type of international law.129
D.

Court Access as International Legal Right

The right to court access also is increasingly expressed in international legal
instruments.130 Unsurprisingly, this development is relatively recent. The right
to court access is an individual right, but international law traditionally
preoccupied itself with relationships between states.131 It was not until after the
129 Along with treaties and customary international law, general principles of law are a
type of international law. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. Specifically, general principles of law are principles
of law common to the world’s major legal systems. See id. (referring to “the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 reporter’s note 7 (1987) (“It has become clear
that this phrase refers to general principles of law common to the major legal systems of the
world.”). Thus, determining whether a putative general principle of law exists involves an
exercise in comparative legal analysis. See MARK WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 59
(5th ed. 2008) (referring to the “search for general principles of law as an exercise in
comparative law”). But see BROWNLIE, supra note 54, at 16 (“It would be incorrect to
assume that tribunals have in practice adopted a mechanical system of borrowing from
domestic law after a census of domestic systems.”). Such an inquiry into the existence of a
general principle of court access would require much more extensive analysis than simply
counting relevant constitutional provisions. Among other things, careful qualitative analysis
of each of those provisions would be necessary. The global constitutional data summarized
above, however, provides one source of preliminary evidence suggesting that the right to
court access is common to the world’s major legal systems and thus may have acquired the
status of a general principle of law. In their discussion of general principles of law, the
reporters of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law stated that “it is plausible to
conclude that a rule against torture is part of international law, since such a principle is
common to all major legal systems.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 102 reporter’s note 7 (1987). The percentage of constitutions with a
prohibition of torture was 37% in 1946, 37% in 1956, 41% in 1966, 45% in 1976, 56% in
1986, 80% in 1996, and 84% in 2006 – lower in all years than the percentage with a right to
court access. Law & Versteeg, supra note 121, at 773-75 & tbl.1. Thus, it would seem
equally plausible that the right to court access is a general principle that is part of
international law – at least from the perspective of comparative constitutional law. As a
procedural principle, the right to court access is arguably an especially appropriate matter to
be addressed from the perspective of general principles of law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. l (1987) (explaining that
general principles of law include “rules relating to the administration of justice” and “rules
of fair procedure generally”); SHAW, supra note 29, at 100 (observing that “[t]he most fertile
fields” for general principles of law have included procedural problems).
130 For a survey of one fundamental attribute of court access rights – the concept of
impartial and independent courts – in human rights instruments, see Caron, supra note 88, at
256.
131 See CASSESE, supra note 56, at 71 (referring to states as traditional subjects of
international law); see also McElhinney v. Ireland, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, 51
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Second World War that international law began systematically addressing
individual rights, such as the right to court access.132
Some international legal instruments give individuals the right to court
access for alleged violations of specified rights. For example, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights provides that “[e]veryone has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.”133 The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that each state
party undertakes to ensure that any person claiming a remedy for alleged
violations of his rights under the covenant “shall have his right thereto
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or
by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State,
and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy.”134
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides that “[e]very
individual shall have the right to have his cause heard” and that this right
comprises, among other things, “[t]he right to an appeal to competent national
organs against acts of violating his fundamental rights as recognized and
guaranteed by conventions, laws, [regulations] and customs in force.”135 The
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters provides that state parties shall
ensure that individuals “have access to a review procedure before a court of
law and/or another independent and impartial body established by law” to
challenge state decisions covered by the convention.136

(Loucaides, J., dissenting) (“The international law immunities originated at a time when
individual rights were practically non-existent and when States needed greater protection
from possible harassment through abusive judicial proceedings.”).
132 See SHAW, supra note 29, at 45-46 (outlining the post-World War II extension of
international law to include individuals within its scope, after a period in which states alone
were said to be the subjects of international law); Francioni, supra note 8, at 5-6 (linking the
emergence of individual court access rights to “the progressive development of human
rights” that followed the “orthodox positivist view” that “international law is a system of
law governing inter-state relations, in which only states have ‘rights’, and obligations”).
133 Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 8, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). The declaration was adopted by forty-eight votes, with
eight abstentions. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg. at 933, U.N. Doc. A/PV.183 (Dec.
10, 1948).
134 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171. The covenant has 167 state parties. Status Table for International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, UN TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/View
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Sept. 16,
2013).
135 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 7, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S.
217. The charter has fifty-three state parties. Legal Instruments, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. &
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, http://www.achpr.org/instruments (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
136 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and
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Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
provides that “[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of
the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in
compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article” and that “[e]veryone
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law” and “shall
have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented.”137 Article 47
further states that “[l]egal aid shall be made available to those who lack
sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access
to justice.”138
Other international agreements recognize a more general right to court
access. For example, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights
provides that “[i]n the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law.”139 As the European Court of Human Rights has held:
[Article 6] secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his
civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal. In this way
the Article embodies the “right to a court,” of which the right of access,
that is the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters,
constitutes one aspect only. To this are added the guarantees laid down by
Article 6 . . . as regards both the organisation and composition of the
court, and the conduct of the proceedings. In sum, the whole makes up the
right to a fair hearing.140

Access to Justice in Environmental Matters art. 9, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447. The
convention has forty-six state parties. Status Table for Convention on Access to Information,
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters,
UN TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ShowMTDSGDetails.aspx?src=UNTS
ONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=XXVII-13&chapter=27&lang=en#Participants (last visited
Sept. 16, 2013).
137 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 90, art. 47.
138 Id. According to Francioni:
[I]t is consistent with the nature of the Charter as an instrument binding upon the
European Union, rather than as a general bill of rights, that this Article creates a right
of access to justice only for the situations where the rights and freedoms guaranteed in
the Charter have been violated by the European Union’s institutions.
Francioni, supra note 8, at 32.
139 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 228. This convention is commonly referred to as the
European Convention on Human Rights. The convention has forty-seven state parties.
Status Table for Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT
=005&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
140 Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1975).
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Similarly, Article 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights states
that “[e]very person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within
a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal,
previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a
criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and
obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.”141
Other international agreements embody a commitment of states to ensure
effective court access. Article 67(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union provides that “[t]he Union shall facilitate access to justice,”142
and Article 81(2) states that the European Parliament and the Council shall
adopt measures to ensure “effective access to justice.”143 In 1980, “[d]esiring
to facilitate international access to justice,” the Hague Conference on Private
International Law concluded the Convention on International Access to
Justice, which provides that “[n]ationals of any Contracting State and persons
habitually resident in any Contracting State shall be entitled to legal aid for
court proceedings in civil and commercial matters in each Contracting State on
the same conditions as if they themselves were nationals of and habitually
resident in that State.”144
These international instruments have a double legal significance. First,
insofar as they constitute legally binding treaties, they impose court access
obligations on their respective state parties.145 Second, these agreements may
provide evidence that the right to court access is emerging as a rule of
customary international law, binding even on states that are not parties to
them.146 Indeed, some scholars have concluded that the right to court access is
already guaranteed by customary international law.147 The precise scope of the
141 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 90, art. 8(1). The convention has
twenty-five state parties. Status Table for American Convention on Human Rights, ORG. OF
AM. STATES, http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_Human_
Rights_sign.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
142 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
67(4), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, 73.
143 Id. art. 81(2).
144 Convention on International Access to Justice art. 1, Oct. 25, 1980, 1510 U.N.T.S.
375, 376. The convention entered into force in 1988 and has twenty-six state parties. Status
Table for Convention on International Access to Justice, UN TREATY COLLECTION, http://
treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800c732c (last visited Sept. 16,
2013).
145 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 339 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by
them in good faith.”).
146 See SHAW, supra note 29, at 96 (“[A] provision in a treaty may constitute the basis of
a rule which, when coupled with the opinio juris, can lead to the creation of a binding
custom governing all states, not just those party to the original treaty . . . .”).
147 See, e.g., Francioni, supra note 8, at 42 (“[A]ccess to justice is a right recognized
under general international law . . . .”); Sciso, supra note 89, at 1212 (endorsing the Italian
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right, however, remains uncertain. For example, while it generally is
understood that the right is not absolute, it is unclear what restrictions
permissibly may be placed on it148 and under what circumstances a nonnational of a state has a right to court access there.149
As one recent study concludes, court access “has come a long way towards
its recognition as a true enforceable right under international law.”150 Even if
the right to court access has yet to become part of customary international law,
the basic principle that persons generally are entitled to have access to a fair
hearing by an independent and impartial court for the determination of a legal
claim is widely accepted and increasingly legalized.151 The right to court
access therefore provides an important normative lens for evaluating the
consequences of the foreign state immunity doctrine. That is the task of the
next Part of this Article.
III. THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN STATE IMMUNITY ON COURT ACCESS
Part II argued that one important criterion for normative evaluation of the
foreign state immunity doctrine is its impact on court access. At one level that
impact is obvious: if a plaintiff sues a defendant in a particular court, and the
court dismisses the suit on foreign state immunity grounds, the plaintiff is
denied access to that court.
But beyond this truism, the court access consequences of foreign state
immunity are poorly understood. For example, some commentators suggest
that the doctrine does no more than deny access to a particular court;152 but this
position that there is a fundamental human right of access to justice “recognized by
international customary law as well as by universal and regional agreements on the issue”);
Wouters et al., supra note 89, at 567 (reporting on view that the individual right of court
access is customary international law).
148 See Francioni, supra note 8, at 33-54 (discussing issues regarding the scope of
potentially permissible restrictions on the right to court access).
149 For example: Does such a right extend beyond that provided by the right against
denial of justice? Does it extend to situations where there could be jurisdiction by necessity?
Compare id. at 41 (concluding that a state is obligated to make a system of effective
remedies available “to all persons subject to its jurisdiction and under its control”), with
Rory Stephen Brown, Access to Justice for Victims of Torture, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A
HUMAN RIGHT, supra note 7, at 205, 216 (“[W]here no realistic alternative remedial avenues
exist, the denial of hearings on the merits to torture victims in third county actions is a
violation of the right of access to justice . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
150 Francioni, supra note 8, at 54.
151 Cf. Caron, supra note 88, at 256 (“Throughout the history of human rights
instruments, the right to an independent and impartial judiciary to decide claims of persons
has been a critical component not only as the particular right in issue, but also as the avenue
by which all other rights are protected.”).
152 See, e.g., FOX, supra note 5, at 74 (arguing that the doctrine “does not confer
impunity; the underlying accountability or substantive responsibility for the matters alleged
in a claim remain; immunity merely bars the adjudication of that claim in a particular
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view underestimates the doctrine’s court access consequences because the
doctrine can preclude access to all courts other than those of the foreign state
itself. Other commentators suggest that, when granted, foreign state immunity
precludes court access altogether;153 but this view overestimates the doctrine’s
court access consequences because another state, perhaps including the foreign
state itself, may provide a suitable alternative forum.
The goal of this Part is to elucidate the court access consequences of the
foreign state immunity doctrine. First, it identifies three ways that the doctrine
can limit court access. Second, it uses empirical analysis to shed light on how
the court access consequences of the foreign state immunity doctrine play out
in real-world litigation.
A.

Limits on Forum State, Third State and Foreign State Court Access

Technically, the foreign state immunity doctrine governs relationships
between states: a foreign state has a right not to be sued in the forum state, and
the forum state has an obligation not to allow a suit against the foreign state to
proceed.154 But the doctrine has important implications for individual court
access. Specifically, the foreign state immunity doctrine can limit (and
potentially preclude) court access in at least three distinct ways: (1) it can bar
court access in the original forum state; (2) it can bar court access in all other
states except the foreign state; and (3) it can operate to leave only the foreign
state’s own courts as an option, even when the foreign state does not offer
meaningful court access. As a result, the foreign state immunity doctrine can
have the ultimate effect of denying a claimant meaningful court access
altogether.
1.

Court Access in the Forum State

If a claimant sues a foreign state in another state’s court, and the court
dismisses the suit on immunity grounds, then the claimant obviously is denied
access to that court. Immunity is therefore a “most problematic” impediment to
court access since “by definition, [it] entail[s] exemptions of foreign states and
their organs from the operation of judicial remedies in the forum state.”155

court”).
153 See, e.g., OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 14, § 109, at 342 (“The grant
of immunity from suit amounts in effect to a denial of a legal remedy in respect of what may
be a valid legal claim; as such, immunity is open to objection.”).
154 See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 15, para. 106; UN Convention,
supra note 2, art. 6 (“A State shall give effect to State immunity . . . by refraining from
exercising jurisdiction . . . against another State and to that end shall ensure that its courts
determine on their own initiative that the immunity of that other State . . . is respected.”).
155 Francioni, supra note 8, at 47.
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Court Access in Third States

If foreign state immunity is a rule of customary international law (as is
generally accepted),156 it is binding on all states, not just a particular forum
state.157 Therefore, absent an applicable exception, the doctrine will generally
deny a claimant court access not only in the forum state, but also in all other
states except the foreign state itself.158
A comparison with other court access doctrines highlights the breadth of the
foreign state immunity doctrine’s impact on court access. If a court in a
particular state dismisses a suit for lack of personal jurisdiction, court access is
denied in that state, but there may be one or more other states that would have
jurisdiction and allow court access. Similarly, if a court in a particular state
dismisses a suit based on the forum non conveniens doctrine, court access is
denied in that state, but there may be one or more other states that would allow
court access. Moreover, unlike the foreign state immunity doctrine, the
doctrines of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens call for
consideration of court access concerns in individual cases.159 The
reasonableness factors that are part of U.S. personal jurisdiction doctrine
include the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief, and a court may not dismiss a
suit on forum non conveniens grounds unless there is an adequate and
available alternative forum.160
3.

Court Access in the Foreign State

In addition, the foreign state – potentially the only state in which court
access is not barred by the foreign state immunity doctrine – might not offer
156

See supra Part I.B.
See CASSESE, supra note 56, at 157 (observing that rules of customary international
law “are normally binding upon all members of the world community”).
158 This is generally, but not always, the case. For example, most of the exceptions to
immunity contained in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act apply only if there are
connections between the underlying activity and the forum state. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(2) (2006) (requiring both commercial activity and a nexus with U.S. territory for an
exception). Likewise, the UN Convention contains exceptions that apply where the forum
state has jurisdiction under “the applicable rules of private international law.” UN
Convention, supra note 2, art. 10(1). Thus, in some cases where a plaintiff selects a forum
that lacks the connections necessary for jurisdiction, the forum must dismiss the suit, but it
is possible that the plaintiff may be able to identify another forum other than the foreign
state itself which does possess the requisite connections or otherwise has jurisdiction under
the rules of private international law. In such cases, there may be a potential alternative to
the foreign state’s own courts.
159 See generally Whytock & Roberston, supra note 114, at 1445-72.
160 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981) (requiring an
adequate alternative forum before dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds); WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (holding that “the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief” is among the factors to be
considered when determining the reasonableness of asserting personal jurisdiction).
157
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meaningful court access. This can occur for several reasons. In some cases, the
foreign state might not be an appropriate forum (or the most appropriate
forum) for the suit based on ordinary private international law considerations
such as the claimant’s nationality, the place of the alleged wrongful conduct,
the place of the alleged injury, and the location of evidence.161 By itself, this
ordinarily will not preclude court access altogether; but it can increase the
costs of litigation, in some cases to the extent that pursuing the claim in the
foreign state will be cost prohibitive.
In addition, many states have domestic rules of immunity.162 Depending on
the foreign state, those rules may preclude suit against it in its own courts.
Even where domestic immunity rules do not preclude suit, the foreign state
may have other court access doctrines that could have this effect.163
Even if the foreign state would otherwise be an appropriate forum (from a
private-international-law perspective) and its domestic law of immunity and
court access would allow a suit to be heard in its courts, other factors may
prevent the claimant from having meaningful court access there. For example,
the foreign state may lack rule of law or its courts may lack judicial
independence or impartiality – characteristics that are always important, but
especially so in suits against a state in its own courts.164 Finally, in some cases,
the foreign state might lack a demonstrated commitment to protecting the
physical integrity rights of its critics, thus raising doubts about the ability of
the claimant and her lawyer to safely pursue her claim there.
In summary, when the foreign state immunity doctrine applies, court access
may be denied not only in the forum state, but also in third states and the
foreign state. In theory, then, a claimant may be left without meaningful court
access anywhere.

161 For example, under the U.S. forum non conveniens doctrine, the factors considered to
determine the most appropriate forum include the “local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home.” Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947).
162 For a discussion of domestic immunity doctrines, see Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Sovereign
Immunity in Perspective, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 12-14 (1986).
163 For a comparative survey of such court access doctrines, see Fawcett, supra note 100.
164 Several international legal instruments consider judicial independence and
impartiality to be necessary for meaningful court access. See, e.g., Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, supra note 90, art. 47 (providing right to a “fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously
established by law”); American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 90, art. 8(1)
(“Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time,
by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law . . . .”);
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note
139, art. 6 (providing right to a “fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law”).
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Empirical Analysis

But beyond theory, how does the foreign state immunity doctrine affect
court access in real-world litigation? To shed light on this question, this
Section uses empirical analysis of foreign state immunity decisions by U.S.
district court judges under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(FSIA), which is the U.S. codification of the foreign state immunity
doctrine.165 Specifically, to shed light on the foreign state immunity doctrine’s
impact on court access in the original forum state, this Section examines how
often U.S. district court judges deny court access on foreign state immunity
grounds, and which types of parties are affected. And to shed light on the
likelihood of alternative court access in the foreign state itself, this Section
assesses judicial independence, rule of law, and the protection of physical
integrity rights in the foreign state in cases where U.S. court access is denied
on foreign state immunity grounds.
The results show that the foreign state immunity doctrine’s impact on court
access is real, not merely theoretical. U.S. district courts frequently deny court
access on foreign state immunity grounds, affecting not only non-U.S.
nationals and individuals, but also U.S. nationals and businesses. Moreover,
the prospects for meaningful court access in the foreign state are often dim
when court access is denied in the United States.
1.

The U.S. Statutory Framework for Foreign State Immunity

The FSIA is the United States’ codification of the foreign state immunity
doctrine. It is the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction in a U.S. court over a
foreign state or a political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a foreign
state.166 Under § 1604 of the FSIA, a foreign state is immune from suit in U.S.

165

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (2006).
See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989)
(“[T]he FSIA provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal
court . . . .”). Section 1603(a) provides that the term “foreign state” includes “a political
subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. §
1603(a). Section 1603(b) provides the following definition for an “agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state”:
[A]ny entity—(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2)
which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of
whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof, and (3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as
defined in section 1332(c) and (e) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third
country.
Id. § 1603(b).
The Supreme Court has held that “a subsidiary of an instrumentality is not itself entitled
to instrumentality status.” Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 473 (2003). For a
comprehensive analysis of the FSIA, see JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 2003).
166
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courts unless an exception specified in the FSIA applies.167 Under § 1330, if an
exception does apply, the FSIA provides both federal subject matter
jurisdiction over the suit and (if service is made in accordance with the FSIA)
personal jurisdiction over the foreign state defendant.168 The FSIA’s
exceptions to immunity include, among others, waiver of immunity by the
foreign state;169 certain suits based on commercial activity of the foreign
state;170 certain suits based on torts occurring in the United States committed
by a foreign state or its official or employee while acting within the scope of
his or her office or employment;171 actions to enforce arbitration agreements
and arbitral awards;172 and suits for money damages against a foreign state
designated by the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism based on
terrorism-related personal injury or death.173
The FSIA’s principal exception to immunity is the commercial activity
exception, which is the hallmark of the restrictive doctrine of foreign state
immunity.174 Under § 1605(a)(2),

167 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (“Subject to existing international agreements to which the
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided
in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.”).
168 See id. § 1330(a) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard
to amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in
section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the
foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or
under any applicable international agreement.”); id. § 1330(b) (“Personal jurisdiction over a
foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have
jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this
title.”); see also Argentine Republic, 488 U.S. at 434 (“Sections 1604 and 1330(a) work in
tandem: § 1604 bars federal and state courts from exercising jurisdiction when a foreign
state is entitled to immunity, and § 1330(a) confers jurisdiction on district courts to hear
suits brought by United States citizens and by aliens when a foreign state is not entitled to
immunity.”). The service provisions of the FSIA are contained in § 1608.
169 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
170 Id. § 1605(a)(2).
171 Id. § 1605(a)(5).
172 Id. § 1605(a)(6).
173 Id. § 1605(a)(7). The FSIA also governs the immunity of foreign state property from
attachment and execution. Specifically, § 1609 provides that the property of a foreign state
is “immune from attachment[,] arrest and execution” unless an exception applies. Id. §
1609. The relevant exceptions are specified in § 1610. For example, property is not immune
if it “is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based.” Id. §
1610(a)(2).
174 See GEORGE A. BERMANN, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 132 (2003) (stating that “[b]y
any measure,” the commercial activity exception is the FSIA’s “principal exception” to
immunity).
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[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case . . . in which the action is based
[1] upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state; or [2] upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or
[3] upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States.175
Each of these three clauses requires that two conditions be satisfied: the
foreign state’s activity must be “commercial” and there must be some
territorial nexus to the United States. Regarding the first condition, the FSIA
provides that “[a] ‘commercial activity’ means either a regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.”176 It does
not define the term “commercial” other than to specify that “[t]he commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its
purpose.”177 The Supreme Court, however, has concluded that a state engages
in “commercial activity” within the meaning of the FSIA when it “acts, not as
regulator of a market, but in the manner of a private player within it.”178 Of
course, confusion can arise in specific cases about the commercial character of
a foreign state’s activity; however, the Supreme Court’s clarification provides
useful guidance for the lower courts.179
2.

The FSIA Dataset

The statistical estimates presented in this Section are based on analysis of an
original dataset of over 350 randomly selected U.S. district court decisions
available in the Lexis online database, in which the court determined whether

175

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (emphasis and clause numbering added). The Supreme Court
has held that for a claim to be “based upon a commercial activity,” “those elements of a
claim that, if proven, would entitle a plaintiff to relief under his theory of the case” must be
based upon such activity. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993).
176 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
177 Id.
178 Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992). As the Court further
explained:
[T]he question is not whether the foreign government is acting with a profit motive or
instead with the aim of fulfilling uniquely sovereign objectives. Rather, the issue is
whether the particular actions that the foreign state performs (whatever the motive
behind them) are the type of actions by which a private party engages in “trade and
traffic or commerce.”
Id.
179 See Working Grp. of the Am. Bar Ass’n, Reforming the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 489, 552 (2002) (suggesting that there is no
need for statutory clarification of the term given the Supreme Court’s guidance).
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to grant immunity under the FSIA (FSIA Dataset).180 The Lexis database
includes all decisions that are published in the Federal Supplement as well as
many (but not all) decisions that are not.181 Decisions published in the Federal
Supplement are not necessarily representative of those that are not.182 Because
the FSIA Dataset’s sample is drawn from a database containing all decisions
published in the Federal Supplement but only a portion of those that are not,
the decisions in the FSIA Dataset may not be representative of the overall
population of the U.S. district courts’ foreign state immunity decisions.
Therefore, estimates for each group of decisions (those that are published in
the Federal Supplement and those that are not) are reported below for purposes
of comparison and to facilitate interpretation of the results.

180 Random selection was used to reduce the risk of selection bias. See Lee Epstein &
Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 110 (2002) (describing random
selection as “the only selection mechanism in large-n studies that automatically guarantees
the absence of selection bias” (emphasis omitted)). I used the following search query in the
Lexis DIST (U.S. District Court Cases, Combined) database on May 11, 2011: “FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT” OR ((“28 USC” OR “28 USCA”) W/2 (1330 OR 1602
OR 1603 OR 1605 OR 1605A OR 1606 OR 1607 OR 1608 OR 1609 OR 1610 OR 1611)).”
The search produced 2104 decisions. I then randomly sorted the decisions and allocated
them among a group of five coders. The coders reviewed the decisions in the random order
in two steps. First, they screened each decision to determine whether it contained an actual
decision whether to grant immunity under the FSIA. Opinions that did not include such a
decision were discarded. Second, decisions that did include a decision whether to grant
immunity under the FSIA were coded to create a wide range of variables. I then reviewed
the accuracy of the coding, making corrections where necessary.
Of 1235 decisions screened, 381 (30.9%) contained FSIA immunity decisions. On this
basis, I estimate that there are approximately 650 (0.309 * 2104) U.S. district court
decisions available in Lexis in which the court determines whether to grant immunity under
the FSIA, and that the FSIA Dataset therefore includes well over half of all such decisions.
Because foreign states have a right to remove suits filed against them in state courts to the
federal courts, I did not include state court decisions in the dataset. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d)
(2006 & Supp. V 2011) (“Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state . . .
may be removed by the foreign state to the district court of the United States for the district
and division embracing the place where such action is pending.”). A search for the term
“Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act” in the STCTS (State Court Cases, Combined) database
on March 6, 2012 generated only eighty-three hits.
181 Specifically, 62.2% of the opinions in the dataset were published in the Federal
Supplement, while the others were not. It is highly unlikely that using Westlaw as a source
of decisions would significantly change any of the results of the analysis. See Brian N.
Lizotte, Publish or Perish: The Electronic Availability of Summary Judgments by Eight
District Courts, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 107, 134 (finding Lexis and Westlaw highly consistent in
cases they report in an analysis of a dataset related to summary judgment in district courts).
182 See Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 781 (2009) (explaining that published court decisions are not
necessarily representative of court decisions in general).
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Each decision in the FSIA Dataset was coded to create a variety of variables
describing the decision and the parties:
• Immunity Granted was coded as 1 (Yes) if the U.S. district court
granted immunity and 0 (No) if it denied immunity.
• Federal Supplement was coded as 1 (Yes) if the decision was reported
in the Federal Supplement and 0 (No) otherwise.
• Plaintiff’s Nationality was coded as 1 (United States) if there was a
U.S. plaintiff and 0 (Foreign) otherwise.
• Type of Plaintiff was coded as 1 (Business Entity) if the plaintiff was a
business entity and 0 (Individual) if the plaintiff was an individual.
In addition, to estimate the likelihood that a foreign state’s courts will offer
meaningful court access if the U.S. court dismisses the suit on immunity
grounds, each decision in the FSIA Dataset was coded using several leading
indicators of judicial independence, rule of law, and protection of physical
integrity rights in the foreign state:
• The CIRI Judicial Independence Indicator is from the CingranelliRichards (CIRI) Human Rights Database, and for most states is
available between 1981 and 2010.183 Judicial independence is rated on
a three-point scale, ranging from 0 (not independent) to 1 (partially
independent) to 2 (generally independent).184 The ratings are based on
assessments of judicial independence in the U.S. State Department’s
annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.185
• The World Bank Rule-of-Law Indicator, published since 1996, is one
of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators.186 Rule of
law is rated on a scale of -2.5 (worst) to 2.5 (best).187 The rating is
183

The CIRI database was created by David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards. For
more information on the database, see CIRI HUM. RIGHTS DATA PROJECT (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://www.humanrightsdata.org/index.asp.
184 DAVID L. CINGRANELLI & DAVID L. RICHARDS, CIRI HUM. RIGHTS DATA PROJECT,
THE CINGRANELLI-RICHARDS (CIRI) HUMAN RIGHTS DATA PROJECT CODING MANUAL
VERSION 2008.3.13, at 95-96 (2008), available at http://www.humanrightsdata.org/
documentation/ciri_coding_guide.pdf (explaining the coding system and describing the
characteristics of each rating).
185 For a detailed explanation of the Judicial Independence indicator, see id. at 95-101.
186 World Governance Indicators, WORLD BANK GRP., http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc-methodology (last updated 2013) (providing a basic
overview of the Worldwide Governance Indicators).
187 Id. As the World Bank explains: “The WGI compile and summarize information from
31 existing data sources that report the views and experiences of citizens, entrepreneurs, and
experts in the public, private and NGO sectors from around the world, on the quality of
various aspects of governance.” Id. For details on the methodology, see Daniel Kaufmann et
al., The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues (World
Bank Grp., Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430, Sept. 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1682130. Annual data are available beginning with 2002, and prior
thereto available for 1996, 1998, and 2000. Id. tbl.1. For years 1997, 1999, and 2001, data
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based on an aggregation of a large number of existing data sources and
is designed to capture “perceptions of the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”188
• The Freedom House Rule-of-Law Rating is only available since
2005.189 The rating ranges from 0 (worst) to 16 (best).190 The rating is
based on the opinions of regional experts and scholars.191
• The CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Indicator (like the CIRI Judicial
Independence Indicator) is from the Cingranelli-Richards Human
Rights Database. The indicator is an additive index rating a state’s
respect for the rights against torture, extrajudicial killing, political
imprisonment, and disappearance.192 The rating “ranges from 0 (no
government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect
for these four rights).”193 Although this indicator does not directly
assess court access rights, a low rating for a state raises the possibility
that a plaintiff (or her lawyer) would place her physical integrity rights
at risk by pursuing a claim against the state there.194
for years 1996, 1998, and 2000, respectively, were used.
188 Kaufmann et al., supra note 187, at 2, 4.
189 Freedom in the World: Aggregate and Subcategory Scores, FREEDOM HOUSE, http://
www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores
(last
visited Sept. 13, 2013). Although the subcategory scores have been included for many years
as factors in Freedom House’s more general political rights and civil liberties ratings, they
have only been reported separately for individual states since 2005. Id.
190 See Methodology, FREEDOM HOUSE, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld-2011/methodology (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
191 Id. (“[S]urvey findings are reached after a multilayered process of analysis and
evaluation by a team of regional experts and scholars. Although there is an element of
subjectivity inherent in the survey findings, the ratings process emphasizes intellectual rigor
and balanced and unbiased judgments.”). Specifically, the Rule-of-Law subcategory rating
is based on regional expert responses to the following questions:
1. Is there an independent judiciary? 2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and
criminal matters? Are police under direct civilian control? 3. Is there protection from
political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that
support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies? 4. Do laws,
policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the
population?
Checklist Questions, FREEDOM HOUSE, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world2012/checklist-questions (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
192 See DAVID L. CINGRANELLI & DAVID L. RICHARDS, CIRI HUM. RIGHTS DATA PROJECT,
SHORT VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS FOR INDICATORS IN THE CINGRANELLI-RICHARDS (CIRI)
HUMAN RIGHTS DATABASE (2008), available at http://www.humanrightsdata.org/
documentation/ciri_variables_short_descriptions.pdf.
193 Id.
194 Cf. Joel H. Samuels, When Is an Alternative Forum Available? Rethinking the
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Impact on Court Access in the United States

First, what light does the FSIA Dataset shed on the foreign state immunity
doctrine’s impact on court access in the forum state (here, the United States)?
As Table 1 indicates, in their foreign state immunity decisions available in
Lexis, U.S. district court judges deny court access on immunity grounds at an
estimated rate of 47.5% [42.5, 52.5].195 In other words, in almost half of these
decisions, the plaintiff is denied U.S. court access.
Table 1. U.S. District Court Decisions Denying Court Access on Foreign State Immunity
Grounds (Decisions Published and Not Published in Federal Supplement Compared)196
Decision
Published in
Federal
Supplement
Yes
No
Overall

Total Number
of Decisions in
FSIA Dataset
237
144
381

Number of Decisions in
FSIA Dataset Denying
Court Access on
Immunity Grounds
103
78
181

Estimated Percentage of
Decisions Denying Court
Access on Immunity
Grounds
43.5% [37.3, 49.8]
54.2% [46.0, 62.1]
47.5% [42.5, 52.5]

For two reasons, the data presented in Table 1 may underestimate the overall
impact of the FSIA on court access. First, as Table 1 indicates, the U.S. district
courts are an estimated 10.7% more likely to grant immunity (and thus deny
court access) in decisions that are not published in the Federal Supplement
than in decisions that are published.197 Although many decisions not published
Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 85 IND. L.J. 1059, 1094-95 (2010) (arguing that as part of
the adequate alternative forum inquiry when deciding whether to dismiss a suit on forum
non conveniens grounds, courts should consider “whether the plaintiff might face political
or social persecution in [the alternative forum] if forced to travel there to litigate the case”).
195 The figures reported in brackets are the lower and upper bounds of the estimate’s
ninety-five percent confidence interval. Statistical estimates are inferences about an overall
“population” of interest (here, the published foreign state immunity decisions of U.S. district
court judges) based on a subset or “sample” drawn from the population of interest (here, a
randomly drawn sample of foreign state immunity decisions of U.S. district court judges
available in the Lexis online database). All such inferences are uncertain. See Epstein &
King, supra note 180, at 37 (“[N]o matter how perfect the research design, no matter how
much data we collect, and no matter how much time, effort, and research resources we
expend, we will never be able to make causal inferences with certainty.”). A ninety-five
percent confidence interval communicates the extent of this uncertainty by indicating that
the true population mean “will be captured within the stated confidence interval in 95 of 100
applications of the same sampling procedure.” Id. at 50 n.145.
196
Table 1 presents estimated overall rates of denial of court access on foreign state
immunity grounds in the U.S. district courts, and compares those rates in decisions
published and not published in the Federal Supplement. Pearson chi-squared = 4.1176; p =
0.042.
197 The p-value of 0.042 indicates that, given the characteristics of the population, the
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in the Federal Supplement are available from Lexis, many are not. Therefore, it
is likely that the overall immunity rate is greater than the 47.5% estimate in
Table 1. If that is correct, then Table 1 would understate the rate at which
immunity is granted (and court access denied) in the overall population of U.S.
district court decisions.198
Second, the problem of case selection effects should be taken into account
when interpreting decision rates such as those presented in Table 1 (and Tables
2 and 3 below).199 Some plaintiffs with meritorious substantive claims against
a foreign state may not file a suit at all because they anticipate that their suit
will be dismissed on foreign state immunity grounds.200 If these suits were
filed notwithstanding a high likelihood of dismissal on immunity grounds, the
immunity rate would presumably be even higher. Thus, the broader impact of
the foreign state immunity doctrine on court access is likely stronger than an
analysis of court decisions can reveal. On the other hand, in some cases a
foreign state defendant might not raise the immunity defense if the defendant
perceives that there is a low likelihood that immunity will be granted. If the
defense nevertheless was raised in these cases, the immunity rate would
presumably be lower. Insofar as the marginal additional cost of adding a
probability of obtaining the Pearson chi-squared statistic of 4.1176 solely by chance is 4.2%.
ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 252 (2010). Thus, using the
conventional 5% level of statistical significance, we can reject the null hypothesis that
publication is not associated with the rate at which judges deny court access on foreign state
immunity grounds.
198 Prior research on judges’ publication decisions finds that, other things being equal, a
sample of only published decisions disproportionately “overlooks more mundane
applications of law” and “addresses complex or difficult issues while neglecting
straightforward ones.” Lizotte, supra note 181, at 146. If this is correct, then Table 1 would
suggest that judges view grants of immunity as more routine than denials of immunity. In
addition, a small percentage of decisions in the FSIA Dataset were reversed on appeal (6.6%
overall) or vacated on rehearing (1.8%). These percentages are higher for decisions denying
immunity (8.0% reversed, 2.0% vacated) than for decisions granting immunity (5.0%
reversed, 1.7% vacated). Thus, the impact of immunity on court access after taking appeals
into account may be greater than the impact suggested by Table 1.
199 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 119, 138-40 (2002) (explaining case-selection effects, the theory that examining the
win rate of decisions will “reveal[] little about the underlying, variegated mass of disputes
and cases” because parties will often settle when the dispute is not a close call, and the
resulting need to consider case strength when interpreting decision rates).
200 See Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearing on H.R.
11315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Gov’t Relations of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 33 (1976) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 11315] (statement of Bruno
A. Ristau, Chief, Foreign Litigation Section, Civil Division, Department of Justice)
(explaining that because of the foreign sovereign immunity barrier prior to the FSIA, “I
would imagine that quite a number of potential litigants simply do not go to court. Once an
effective remedy for bringing an in personam action against a foreign state is provided, there
is a likelihood, in my judgment, that there might be more suits”).
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foreign state immunity defense to an overall defense strategy is relatively low,
however, any offsetting effect of this tendency would seem to be minimal. In
addition, to the extent the stakes are similar for both parties and they are able
to accurately determine their respective probabilities of winning, case selection
effects may create a general tendency toward fifty-percent win rates.201 This
possibility, however, does not alter the basic conclusion that in many cases,
plaintiffs are denied U.S. court access on foreign state immunity grounds.202
Both U.S. citizens and foreign citizens frequently lose U.S. court access on
foreign state immunity grounds. As Table 2 indicates, although court access is
denied on foreign state immunity grounds slightly more often when there is a
U.S. plaintiff than otherwise, the difference is not statistically significant.203
Insofar as this finding may suggest that there is not systematic discrimination
against non-U.S. citizens in foreign state immunity decisionmaking by the U.S.
district courts, this finding may be a welcome one. To some, however, the rate
at which U.S. citizens are denied access to U.S. courts would be special cause
for alarm. For example, as Mathias Reimann argues, “Denial of court access
[based on foreign state immunity] is especially serious when it occurs in the
[plaintiff’s] home country. In such a case, the very government that demands
loyalty from, and thus owes protection to, the plaintiff, refuses to assist him in
the vindication of his . . . rights.”204

201 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 17-20 (1984) (developing this fifty-percent hypothesis); Steven Shavell,
Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493, 499-501
(1996) (questioning the fifty-percent hypothesis and arguing that the fifty-percent plaintiff
win rate is not a “central tendency, either in theory or in fact”).
202 Moreover, it is possible that in some cases, if court access had not been denied on
foreign state immunity grounds, it would have been denied on other grounds – such as
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, lack of personal jurisdiction, or
forum non conveniens. In such cases, the foreign state immunity doctrine should not be
viewed as solely responsible for a denial of court access. The dataset cannot answer this
counter-factual question. The dataset, however, does provide some clues: in 15.8% of the
cases in the dataset in which immunity was granted, the court also dismissed on alternative
grounds, and in 15.7% of the cases in the dataset in which immunity was not granted, the
suit was dismissed on other grounds.
203 Pearson chi-squared = 0.1229; p = 0.726.
204 Mathias Reimann, A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some Thoughts
on Prinz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 403, 419 (1995); see also
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 490 (1983) (observing that the
House Report on the FSIA “expresses the desire to ensure ‘[U.S.] citizens . . . access to the
courts’” (emphasis omitted)).
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Table 2. U.S. District Court Decisions Denying Court Access on Foreign State Immunity
Grounds (U.S. and Foreign Plaintiffs Compared)205

U.S. Plaintiff

Total Number of
Decisions in FSIA
Dataset

Yes
No
Overall

294
83
377

Number of Decisions
in FSIA Dataset
Denying Court Access
on Immunity Grounds
141
38
179

Estimated Percentage of
Decisions Denying Court
Access on Immunity
Grounds
48.0% [42.3, 53.7]
45.8% [35.5, 56.5]
47.5% [42.5, 52.5]

One might expect that the commercial activity exception would make it
uncommon for business plaintiffs to be denied court access on foreign state
immunity grounds. As Table 3 indicates, however, this is not the case. The
estimated rate at which U.S. district courts deny court access to individual
plaintiffs on immunity grounds is 53.5% [46.6, 60.3], and the estimated rate for
business entity plaintiffs is 42.5% [35.4, 50.0]. The estimated rate for U.S.
businesses specifically is 45.2% [36.8, 53.9].
Table 3. U.S. District Court Decisions Denying Court Access on Foreign State Immunity
Grounds (Individual and Business Entity Plaintiffs Compared)206

Type of Plaintiff

Total Number
of Decisions in
FSIA Dataset

Individual
Business Entity
Total

198
174
372

Number of Decisions
in FSIA Dataset
Denying Court Access
on Immunity Grounds
106
74
180

Estimated Percentage of
Decisions Denying Court
Access on Immunity
Grounds
53.5% [46.6, 60.3]
42.5% [35.4, 50.0]
48.4% [43.4, 53.5]

In summary, U.S. district court judges frequently deny court access on
foreign state immunity grounds. Both U.S. and non-U.S. parties, and both
individuals and businesses, are affected. Because the estimated dismissal rate
is higher in decisions that are not published in the Federal Supplement than

205

Table 2 compares estimated rates of denial of court access on foreign state immunity
grounds in the U.S. district courts when there is a U.S. plaintiff (Yes) and when there is not
(No). Data for the nationality of the parties are unavailable for a significant number of cases.
Therefore, the overall “Total Number of Decisions in FSIA Dataset” is lower than 381 in
Table 2. Pearson chi-squared = 0.1229; p = 0.726.
206
Table 3 compares estimated rates of denial of court access on foreign state immunity
grounds in the U.S. district courts for individual and business entity plaintiffs. Data for the
type of plaintiff are unavailable for a significant number of cases. Therefore, the overall
“Total Number of Decisions in FSIA Dataset” is lower than 381 in Table 3. Pearson chisquared = 4.4925; p = 0.034.
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those that are, and because Lexis does not include many decisions that are not
published in the Federal Supplement, the overall dismissal rate is likely higher
than the estimates above suggest. Therefore, this analysis probably
underestimates the impact of the foreign state immunity doctrine on U.S. court
access.
4.

The Likelihood of Meaningful Court Access in the Foreign State

As discussed above, if the foreign state immunity doctrine is a rule of
customary international law, then absent an applicable exception, the doctrine
will ordinarily preclude court access not only in the forum state, but in all
states other than the foreign state itself.207 But how often will the foreign state
be likely to provide meaningful court access? To help answer this question,
this Section analyzes the indicators of judicial independence, rule of law, and
physical integrity rights discussed above for the foreign state in each decision
in the FSIA Dataset denying U.S. court access on immunity grounds.
The results are summarized in Table 4. The mean and median scores for the
indicators are all roughly in the middle of their respective ranges. The
indicators thus suggest that in the typical case the foreign state will offer partial
judicial independence, an intermediate level of rule of law, and partial respect
for physical integrity rights. From this perspective, in the typical case, the
outlook for meaningful court access in the foreign state is neither especially
promising nor especially bleak.

207

See supra Part III.A.2.
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Table 4. Foreign State’s Judicial Independence, Rule-of-Law, and Physical Integrity Rights
Ratings When U.S. Court Access Is Denied on Foreign State Immunity Grounds208
Indicator

Range

No. of
Decisions

Mean

Median

Worst 25th
Percentile

CIRI Judicial
Independence
Indicator

From 0 (not independent)
to 1 (partially
independent) to 2
(generally independent)

162

1.19

1

0

From -2.5 (worst) to 2.5
(best)

108

.24

0

-0.60

From 0 (worst) to 15
(best)

55

8.76

9

4

From 0 (no government
respect for physical
integrity rights) to 8 (full
government respect for
those rights)

159

4.70

5

3

World Bank
Rule-of-Law
Indicator
Freedom
House Ruleof-Law Rating
CIRI Physical
Integrity
Rights
Indicator

The indicators suggest that in 25% of cases, however, the foreign state will
offer only low levels of rule of law and low respect for physical integrity
rights. Moreover, a closer look at the CIRI Judicial Independence Indicator
suggests that in many cases the foreign state likely will be unable to offer
meaningful court access. As Figure 2 shows, in an estimated 26.5% of cases
the foreign state has a rating of 0 (not independent) – which indicates that
“there are active and widespread constraints on the judiciary. These typically
involve limitations of judicial independence including active government
interference in the decision of cases or widespread corruption and judicial
intimidation from either inside or outside government.”209 Even in the
estimated 28.4% of cases with a rating of 1 (partially independent), “[j]udges
rule against the government in some, but not all potential cases, at times

208

Table 4 presents various judicial independence, rule of law, and physical integrity
rights indicators for the foreign state in cases in the FSIA Dataset in which a U.S. district
court denied court access on foreign state immunity grounds. A total of 181 decisions in the
dataset denied U.S. court access on immunity grounds. Due to the temporal and
geographical limitations of the indicators, the indicators are not available for all such
decisions. The number of decisions for which each indicator is available is indicated in the
No. of Decisions column.
209 CINGRANELLI & RICHARDS, supra note 184, at 96.
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avoiding government-related cases or giving in to government pressure to rule
in the government’s favor.”210
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Figure 2. Foreign State’s CIRI Judicial Independence Indicator When U.S. Court Access Is
Denied on Foreign State Immunity Grounds211

Judicial Independence Score (CIRI)

Varied types of plaintiffs are involved in cases in which court access is
denied on foreign state immunity grounds and the foreign state is “not
independent.” In an estimated 51.1% of these cases, the plaintiffs are
individuals, and in an estimated 48.8% the plaintiffs are business entities. An
estimated 76.7% involve a U.S. plaintiff and 23.3% involve only non-U.S.
plaintiffs. The data thus suggest that the impact of the foreign state immunity
doctrine on court access is spread across a variety of types of parties.
In addition, as Figure 3 shows, in a significant number of cases, the CIRI
Physical Integrity Rights Indicator suggests that the foreign state has very low
respect for the rights against torture, extrajudicial killing, political
imprisonment, and disappearance – which is far from reassuring for a plaintiff
contemplating a suit against the foreign state there.

210

Id.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of U.S. district court decisions in the FSIA Dataset
denying court access on foreign state immunity grounds according to the foreign state’s
CIRI Judicial Independence Indicator. The indicator ranges from Not Independent (0) to
Generally Independent (2).
211
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Figure 3. Foreign State’s CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Indicator When U.S. Court Access
Is Denied on Foreign State Immunity Grounds212
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These results do offer encouragement for many plaintiffs denied court
access on foreign state immunity grounds. As Figure 2 shows, in many cases
the CIRI Judicial Independence Indicator suggests that the foreign state’s
courts are likely to provide fair and independent adjudication of the plaintiff’s
claim (assuming the foreign state’s own immunity and court access doctrines
do not bar the suit). Moreover, Figure 2 suggests that, on average, the lower a
foreign state’s judicial independence indicator, the less likely U.S. district
court judges are to deny court access on immunity grounds.213
Nevertheless, it appears that in many cases in which a U.S. court denies
court access on foreign state immunity grounds, the foreign state lacks robust
judicial independence or rule of law according to a variety of measures, and
may therefore fail to provide a meaningful alternative forum for the plaintiff’s
claim against the foreign state. In such circumstances, a decision to deny U.S.
court access may be tantamount to a decision to deny meaningful court access
212

Figure 3 shows the distribution of U.S. district court decisions in the FSIA Dataset
denying court access on foreign state immunity grounds according to the foreign state’s
CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Indicator. The indicator ranges from 0 (no respect for
physical integrity rights) to 8 (full respect for physical integrity rights).
213 Further statistical analysis is consistent with this inference: the estimated immunity
rates are 58.9% when the courts are Generally Independent (2), 46.0% when the courts are
Partially Independent (1), and 37.4% when the courts are Not Independent (0). Pearson chisquared = 11.2145; p = 0.004.
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altogether. Even when these indicators are favorable, the foreign state’s own
immunity doctrine or other court access doctrines may nevertheless bar the suit
there.
This Section’s empirical analysis is only a first step toward understanding
the foreign state immunity doctrine’s impact on court access in real-world
litigation. In particular, cross-national variation in judicial implementation of
the foreign state immunity doctrine means that the doctrine’s impact on court
access may likewise vary cross-nationally. Comparative empirical research
would be needed to understand that variation. Moreover, scholars could gain a
more complete understanding of the doctrine’s impact on court access by not
only examining immunity decisions, but also tracing postdismissal
developments in each case to determine ultimate outcomes, whether through
litigation or diplomacy. This Part’s analysis provides a point of departure for
such research, as well as a strong indication that the foreign state immunity
doctrine does have an important real-world impact on court access.
IV. MITIGATING THE TENSION BETWEEN FOREIGN STATE IMMUNITY AND
COURT ACCESS: A PROPOSAL
This Article has argued that the right to court access is widely recognized
and increasingly legalized.214 But it also has provided evidence that the foreign
state immunity doctrine imposes serious barriers to court access that may, in
some cases, preclude meaningful court access altogether.215 Can this tension
between foreign state immunity and the right to court access be mitigated?
This Part argues that recent regional and international court decisions
effectively prioritize immunity over court access, thus exacerbating rather than
mitigating this tension. It then proposes an alternative proportionality approach
designed to mitigate the tension between the foreign state immunity doctrine
and the right to court access. Specifically, foreign state immunity should not be
granted if its impact on the claimant’s ability to obtain court access would be
disproportionate to the benefits of immunity for relations between the forum
state and the foreign state. Otherwise, the foreign state immunity doctrine,
including recognized exceptions to immunity, would apply normally. Although
the proportionality approach is subject to significant objections, it has the
major advantage of taking seriously both the foreign state immunity doctrine’s
functional justifications and the importance of court access.
A.

The Status Quo

Recent international and regional court decisions indicate that, unless there
is an applicable exception to foreign state immunity recognized by status quo
customary international law, the forum state is required to grant immunity
regardless of the court access consequences in a particular case – even if the

214
215

See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
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result is that the claimant will not have meaningful court access anywhere. In
this sense, these decisions suggest that the customary international law of
foreign state immunity categorically prevails over the right to court access.
For example, the ICJ prioritized foreign state immunity over the right to
court access in Germany v. Italy.216 In that case, Italy allowed a suit in its
courts to proceed against Germany for alleged violations of jus cogens norms
of international law, notwithstanding Germany’s assertion of foreign state
immunity.217 Among other things, Italy argued that international law does not
provide immunity for violations of jus cogens norms.218 The ICJ rejected the
argument, finding that customary international law recognized no such
exception, and that there was in any event no conflict between foreign state
immunity, which is a procedural rule, and jus cogens norms, which are
substantive.219
The ICJ did not explicitly discuss court access rights in its opinion, even
though Italy raised the issue in its counter-memorial and Germany addressed it
216

Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 15, para. 136 (upholding Germany’s
claim to sovereign immunity when sued in Italian national courts for alleged human rights
violations); see also Ingrid Wuerth, International Law in Domestic Courts and the
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State Case, 13 MELB. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2012) (observing that
sovereign immunity “has come under pressure generated by the logic and normative
underpinnings of international human rights law, which demands accountability for
egregious violations of human dignity” but that the ICJ in Germany v. Italy nevertheless
“reaffirmed, in strong and certain terms, the immunity of states from human rights claims
made in foreign national courts”).
217 See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 15, paras. 27-29 (delineating
the procedural history of the case in Italian courts, which permitted the suit to proceed
against Germany in spite of its sovereign immunity defense, based on the Court of Appeal
of Florence’s conclusion that “jurisdictional immunity is not absolute and cannot be invoked
by a State in the face of acts by that State which constitute crimes under international law”).
Jus cogens norms, sometimes called peremptory norms, are rules of international law that
are “accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character.” MURPHY, supra note 2, at 96.
218 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 15, para. 92 (explaining Italy’s
argument that international law does not provide foreign state immunity against suits
alleging violations of jus cogens norms). For examples of scholarship advocating a jus
cogens exception to foreign state immunity, see Adam C. Belsky et al., Implied Waiver
Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of
International Law, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 365, 389-92 (1989); Brown, supra note 149, at 227
(arguing that states should not “be shielded by immunity rules from civil liability for
torture”); Reimann, supra note 204, at 419.
219 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 15, paras. 91, 93, 97 (“[U]nder
customary international law as it presently stands, a State is not deprived of immunity by
reason of the fact that it is accused of serious violations of international human rights law or
the international law of armed conflict. . . . The rules of State immunity are procedural in
character . . . .”).
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in its reply.220 The ICJ, however, did acknowledge Italy’s argument that
immunity should be denied “because all other attempts to secure compensation
for the various groups of victims involved in the Italian proceedings had
failed.”221 The ICJ rejected this argument, explaining that it could “find no
basis in the State practice from which customary international law is derived
that international law makes the entitlement of a State to immunity dependent
upon the existence of effective alternative means of securing redress.”222
According to this reasoning, unless status quo international law provides an
applicable exception to immunity under the facts of the case, immunity will be
granted and the suit dismissed – regardless of the impact on court access.
The tension between foreign state immunity and the right to court access
was addressed more directly by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
in a series of cases decided in 2001: Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, Fogarty v.
United Kingdom, and McElhinney v. Ireland.223 In each of these cases, the
ECHR held that a forum state’s grant of immunity to a foreign state defendant
did not violate the applicant’s right to court access under Article Six of the
European Convention on Human Rights.224
220 See Counter-Memorial of Italy, Case Concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the
State (Ger. v. It.) 73-80 (Dec. 22, 2009), available at www.icjcij.org/docket/files/143/16648.pdf (arguing that there is an “irreducible contradiction”
between an individual’s right to access justice and the idea of sovereign immunity, detailing
the history of the right of access to justice in international and Italian law, arguing that the
right is a part of human rights law, and concluding that “the implication of the immunity
principle cannot be impunity”); Reply of Federal Republic of Germany, Case Concerning
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State 36-38 (Oct. 5, 2010), available at http://www.icj-cij.
org/docket/files/143/16650.pdf (responding to Italy’s right of access arguments by asserting
that this right must be interpreted in harmony with existing international law, including
foreign state immunity).
221 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 15, para. 98.
222 Id. para. 101.
223 Fogarty v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 157, 167 (“[T]he United Kingdom
cannot be said to have exceeded the margin of appreciation allowed to States in limiting an
individual’s access to a court.”); Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79,
98-99 (holding that the right of court access provided by Article Six of the European
Convention of Human Rights is subject to certain limitations, provided that those limitations
“do not restrict or reduce the access . . . to such an extent that the very essence of the right is
impaired”); McElhinney v. Ireland, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, 47 (upholding the Irish
court’s decision to bar the claimant’s suit against the British Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland on foreign state immunity grounds, notwithstanding the claimant’s assertion of his
right to court access under Article Six of the European Convention of Human Rights).
224 Fogarty, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 167; Al-Adsani, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 103
(“[T]he application by the English courts of the provisions of the 1978 Act to uphold
Kuwait’s claim to immunity cannot be said to have amounted to an unjustified restriction on
the applicant’s access to a court.”); McElhinney, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 47 (“In these
circumstances, the decisions of the Irish courts upholding the United Kingdom’s claim to
immunity cannot be said to have exceeded the margin of appreciation allowed to States in
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The ECHR’s basic reasoning in the three cases was the same.225 First, the
ECHR acknowledged that “Article 6 § 1 secures to everyone the right to have
any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court.”226
But the ECHR also observed that the right is not absolute, and that limitations
may be permitted “since the right of access by its very nature calls for
regulation by the State.”227 The ECHR then set forth a standard for determining
whether given limitations are permitted:
[The Court] must be satisfied that the limitations applied do not restrict or
reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent
that the very essence of the right is impaired. Furthermore, a limitation
will not be compatible with Article 6 § 1 if it does not pursue a legitimate
aim and if there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between
the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.228
Applying the “legitimate aim” element, the Court noted that the foreign state
immunity doctrine “is a concept of international law, developed out of the
principle par in parem non habet imperium.”229 On that ground alone, the
ECHR concluded that the grant of immunity “pursues the legitimate aim of
complying with international law to promote comity and good relations
between States through the respect of another State’s sovereignty.”230 This step
in the ECHR’s analysis prioritizes immunity over court access: a forum state’s
denial of court access automatically satisfies the legitimate aim element if the
denial is based on the status quo customary international law of foreign state
immunity – regardless of the forum state’s actual aims and regardless of
whether the grant of immunity would in fact promote comity and good
relations in the particular case.
Next, applying the “proportionality” element of the standard, the ECHR
began by asserting that “[t]he Convention should so far as possible be
interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms
part, including those relating to the grant of State immunity.”231 This step in
the ECHR’s reasoning further prioritizes immunity over court access by
requiring that any lack of harmony between the two principles be resolved by
limiting an individual’s access to a court.”); see also supra Part II.D (describing the right to
court access under the European Convention on Human Rights).
225 While the citations below are to Al-Adsani, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 99-100, the same
reasoning is found in Fogarty, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 166-67, and McElhinney, 2001-XI
Eur. Ct. H.R. at 46-47.
226 Al-Adsani, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 99.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 100 (“[A]ccount is to be taken of ‘any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties.’” (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, supra note 145, art. 31(3)(c), at 12-13)).
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using interpretive methods to conform Article 6’s right to court access to the
status quo customary international law of state immunity, not vice versa.
Indeed, according to the ECHR, “[i]t follows that measures taken by a High
Contracting Party [to the Convention] which reflect generally recognised rules
of public international law on State immunity cannot in principle be regarded
as imposing a disproportionate restriction on the right of access to a court as
embodied in Article 6 § 1.”232 By reaching this conclusion “in principle,” the
ECHR avoids any inquiry into whether there is actually a “reasonable
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim
sought to be achieved” in a particular case.233 Under this approach, if
international law provides for immunity, immunity automatically trumps the
right to court access – regardless of the facts of the case. Thus, notwithstanding
the ECHR’s use of the term “proportionality,” this is not a real proportionality
test, because it considers any limitation on court access based on the customary
international law of immunity to be proportionate ipso facto.
In the end, the ECHR’s response to the tension between foreign state
immunity and court access boils down to this: if international law provides for
immunity under the facts of the case, then there is no right to court access. The
approach both takes for granted the benefits of immunity and fails to inquire
into the costs of denying court access in a particular case. As a result,
notwithstanding the ECHR’s references to the concepts of “legitimate aim”
and “proportionality,” the ECHR’s approach effectively prioritizes the foreign
state immunity doctrine over the right to court access.234 Thus, according to
both the ECHR’s decisions in Al-Adsani, Fogarty, and McElhinney, as well as
the ICJ’s decision in Germany v. Italy, the status quo customary international
law of foreign state immunity categorically prevails over the right to court
access.

232

Id. at 100.
Id. at 99-100.
234 Others have offered similar critiques of the Al-Adsani, Fogarty, and McElhinney
decisions. See, e.g., Richard Garnett, State Immunity Triumphs in the European Court of
Human Rights, 118 L.Q. REV. 367, 371 (2002) (arguing that the ECHR left no scope in its
analysis “to examine the competing interests by reference to the facts of the case, for
example, the foreign State’s concern for its sovereignty or security if the matter proceeds, as
opposed to the individual’s likelihood of redress by alternative means if it does not”);
Emmanuel Voyiakis, Access to Court v. State Immunity, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 297, 311-12
(2003) (arguing that the ECHR’s analysis “seemed to ‘rig’ the conflict [between immunity
and court access] at its very outset” and that it “never took up the task of weighing the State
parties’ claim to comply with international law against the applicants’ right of access to
court”). But see Siobhán McInerney-Lankford, Fragmentation of International Law Redux:
The Case of Strasbourg, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 614 (2012) (arguing that in the Al
Adsani, Fogarty, and McElhinney decisions, the European Court “reject[ed] any
presumptive primacy of state immunity over rights”).
233
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A Proportionality Approach

A fundamental problem with the ICJ and ECHR’s categorical approach is
that it can require immunity regardless of whether immunity would advance
the foreign state immunity doctrine’s underlying foreign relations function, and
regardless of the impact on court access. This Section proposes an alternative –
a genuine proportionality approach – that assesses both the foreign relations
benefits and the court access costs of immunity on a case-by-case basis. While
subject to significant objections, which will be addressed below, the
proportionality approach has a major advantage over the status quo: it takes
seriously not only the core functional justification for the foreign state
immunity doctrine, but also the importance of court access.
1.

Proposal

Under the proportionality approach, foreign state immunity should not be
granted if doing so would have an impact on the claimant’s ability to obtain
court access that would be disproportionate to the benefits of immunity for
relations between the forum state and the foreign state. Otherwise, the foreign
state immunity doctrine, including recognized exceptions to immunity, would
apply normally.235
Importantly, this approach would require a genuine case-specific factual
basis for determining the foreign relations benefits and court access
consequences of a grant of immunity. If these determinations were instead
based on general assumptions about the potential effects of litigation on
foreign relations or the potential effects of immunity on court access, then the
approach would be unable to identify the cases in which court access
consequences would be disproportionate to foreign relations benefits.236
Two presumptions might be useful to facilitate the analysis. If the foreign
state will provide the claimant with a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously
established by law, there is a rebuttable presumption that a grant of immunity
will not have a disproportionate impact on the claimant’s ability to obtain court
access. Otherwise, there is a rebuttable presumption that a grant of immunity
will have a disproportionate impact on the claimant’s ability to obtain court
access.237
235

Cf. Francioni, supra note 8, at 50 (“A more satisfactory approach to reconciling
immunities and access to justice is to recognize that both reflect norms of customary
international law which need to be reconciled through a pragmatic approach and a careful
balancing of the competing interests in the concrete cases.”).
236 This is one of the problems with the European Court of Human Rights’ approach to
the “legitimate aim” element of its proportionality test, which automatically finds the
element satisfied if immunity is called for by the foreign state immunity doctrine. See supra
Part IV.A (delineating and assessing the court’s approach).
237 The standard used to trigger the first presumption is based on the language used in
international agreements expressing the right to court access. See, e.g., American

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2383372

2013]

FOREIGN STATE IMMUNITY

2083

The first presumption would apply in situations where the claimant is likely
to obtain meaningful court access in the foreign state’s own courts.238 In these
situations, the impact of immunity on court access ordinarily should be
relatively low, so absent evidence to the contrary, that impact should not be
expected to be disproportionate to the foreign relations benefits of immunity.
The second presumption would apply in situations where the claimant is
unlikely to obtain meaningful court access in the foreign state’s own courts.239
In these situations, access to the forum state’s courts should not be denied on
immunity grounds unless there are compelling foreign relations reasons to
grant immunity. In general, the greater the gravity of the wrongs alleged by the
claimant, the more compelling those reasons would need to be to rebut the
presumption.240
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 90, art. 8(1) (“Every person has the right to a
hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent,
and impartial tribunal, previously established by law . . . .”); Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 139, art. 6 (providing the right to a
“fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law”); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 90,
art. 47 (providing the right to a “fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law”); cf. Convention on
Choice of Court Agreements art. 9(e), concluded June 30, 2005, available at http://www.
hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt37en.pdf (referring to “fundamental principles of procedural
fairness”).
238 This presumption finds support in the principle of exhaustion of remedies. Under the
law of state responsibility, before a state’s claim on behalf of one of its nationals is
admissible, the national ordinarily must have exhausted the legal remedies available in the
state alleged to have caused the injury. See BROWNLIE, supra note 54, at 492 (“A claim will
not be admissible on the international plane unless the individual alien or corporation
concerned has exhausted the legal remedies available to him in the state which is alleged to
be the author of injury.”).
239 This presumption finds support in the principle of excuse of exhaustion of remedies
based on futility. See id. at 495 (“In certain circumstances recourse to local remedies is
excused. . . . The best test appears to be that an effective remedy must be available ‘as a
matter of reasonable possibility.’ . . . [A] fair number of writers and arbitral awards have
been willing to presume ineffectiveness of remedies from the circumstances, for example on
the basis of evidence that the courts were subservient to the executive.” (citations omitted)).
It also finds support in the principle of jurisdiction by necessity (sometimes referred to as
forum necessitatis or forum conveniens). Fawcett, supra note 100, at 6 (observing that under
the principle of jurisdiction by necessity, “a court tak[es] jurisdiction on the ground that the
local forum is the appropriate forum (or an appropriate forum) for trial or that the forum
abroad is inappropriate”); see also HAY ET AL., supra note 103, § 6.6, at 402 (explaining that
jurisdiction by necessity, where it exists, provides for jurisdiction where “no reasonable
alternative forum exists and the connection of the parties and events makes the chosen
forum a fair one”).
240 See Brown, supra note 149, at 218 (“[T]he right of access gains importance in a
directly proportionate relationship to the importance of the right(s) allegedly violated and
the gravity of the alleged violation.” (emphasis omitted)); Francioni, supra note 8, at 50
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A proportionality approach, while not reflected in the ICJ and ECHR’s
understanding of the status quo international law of immunity, is not a radical
proposal.241 As one expert on foreign state immunity notes, “[I]f there is no
remedy [in the foreign state] for the individual plaintiff, it surely becomes the
more imperative for the forum State’s courts to provide one.”242 Thus, “proof
of the availability of some alternative method of settlement may influence the
municipal court in its refusal to exercise jurisdiction over the foreign State,
[even though] it has no competence to make its decision dependent on that
State’s acceptance of such an alternative method.”243 As another expert argues,
“[B]alancing the rights of the litigating parties in respect of the issue in a given
case would produce a better result” than the current approach to foreign state
immunity.244 In particular, there would seem to be no point in denying court
access based on the foreign state immunity doctrine unless doing so would
significantly advance the doctrine’s underlying foreign relations function.245
(arguing for a balancing approach that includes consideration of “the nature of the injury for
which judicial protection is sought” so as to ensure such protection for “certain human rights
norms, such as those prohibiting torture, genocide, slavery, and arbitrary killing”).
241 See, e.g., Arthur J S Hall & Co. v. Simons, [2002] 1 A.C. 615 (H.L.) 710 (appeal
taken from Eng.) (citing Rees v. Sinclair, [1974] 1 NZLR 180, 187) (arguing that “[a]ny
immunity from suit is a derogation from a person’s fundamental right of access to the court
which has to be justified” and that “the protection of the immunity should not be given any
wider application than is absolutely necessary in the interests of the administration of
justice”); Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 115 (Loucaides, J.,
dissenting) (“Any form of blanket immunity, whether based on international law or national
law, which is applied by a court in order to block completely the judicial determination of a
civil right without balancing the competing interests, namely those connected with the
particular immunity and those relating to the nature of the specific claim which is the
subject matter of the relevant proceedings, is a disproportionate limitation on [the right to
court access] and for that reason it amounts to a violation of that [right].”).
242 FOX, supra note 5, at 59.
243 Id. at 146.
244 BANKAS, supra note 80, at 364; see also Philippa Webb, Regional Challenges to the
Law of State Immunity 2 (Eur. Soc’y of Int’l Law, Conference Paper No. 6, 2012), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2193750 (“[T]he law on state immunity . . . must . . . develop in
a way that balances respect for sovereignty with commercial accountability and the desire to
end impunity.”).
245 See Hearing on H.R. 11315, supra note 245, at 62-63 (statement of Michael H.
Cardozo, Attorney, Washington, D.C.) (arguing that scope of foreign state immunity
“depends on the extent to which a nation feels that its good relations with other countries
will be enhanced by the grant of immunity”); Michael H. Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The
Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 67 HARV. L. REV. 608, 614 (1954) (arguing that whether
immunity should be granted depends on whether “the interests of foreign relations [will] be
furthered by relieving [the foreign state] from responding in court”); cf. FOX, supra note 5,
at 55 (“There seems little point in rules of State immunity unless they are supported by
convincing reasons of policy.”); Sucharitkul, supra note 73, at 120-21 (arguing that
“[f]unctional immunities are self-restrictive in the sense that the functional criterion operates
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Objections

Nevertheless, there are several significant objections to the proportionality
approach. First, it is not necessarily appropriate for courts to make assessments
about the foreign relations consequences of lawsuits.246 According to this
objection, courts are not well equipped institutionally to make such
assessments, and by doing so they risk intruding on the foreign relations
functions of the executive branch of government.247 In response to this
objection, courts could defer to executive branch assessments of the foreign
relations benefits of immunity in particular cases. But there are potential
disadvantages to executive involvement in foreign state immunity
decisionmaking. For example, as the U.S. experience prior to the FSIA
suggests, placing the executive branch in charge of foreign state immunity
decisionmaking can complicate its efforts to perform its diplomatic
functions.248
to limit the extent of . . . immunities” and that “[t]he concept of functional necessities
delineates areas where immunities are recognised from those where the doctrine of
immunity does not apply”).
246 Moreover, there is a risk that by making immunity decisions turn in part on foreign
relations consequences, a moral hazard might be created by giving actual or potential
foreign state defendants an incentive to disrupt or threaten to disrupt relations with the
forum state in the event of litigation against it. While this may be a genuine risk, it would
seem unlikely that foreign states would frequently use disruption of foreign relations as a
litigation-avoidance strategy.
247 Cf. Hearing on H.R. 11315, supra note 245, at 64 (statement by Michael H. Cardozo,
Attorney, Washington, D.C.) (“[T]o lose the flexibility [in the conduct of foreign relations]
by an act of Congress . . . disables the Secretary of State from making emergency decisions
[and] could embroil us in considerable difficulty and embarrassment.”).
248 See id. at 31 (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State)
(supporting the FSIA because the practice then in place “caused foreign relations problems
for the executive branch” and the FSIA would remedy the situation by “depoliticiz[ing] the
area of sovereign immunity by placing the responsibility for determining questions of
sovereign immunity in the courts”). This was the U.S. State Department’s principal
argument in favor of the FSIA, which transferred immunity decisionmaking in the United
States from the executive branch to the judicial branch. See supra Part III.B.1 (providing an
overview of the FSIA). In contrast, however, the State Department now urges that it be
given a leading role in the distinct field of foreign-official immunity and that courts defer to
its determinations in that context. See Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity
Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L.
915, 918 (2011) (“The State Department asserts that it has complete control over foreign
official immunity determinations in U.S. courts . . . .”). The drawbacks of executive
involvement might at least be partly mitigated by limiting judicial deference to genuine
case-specific executive branch findings regarding the likely foreign relations consequences
of a lawsuit (as opposed to more general suggestions of immunity). Another method – one
that would avoid some of the disadvantages of the executive deference route – would be to
establish ex ante categories of foreign state activity that, if subject to adjudication in another
state’s courts, would likely have an adverse effect on foreign relations. For example, in
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This first objection should be kept in perspective, however. Courts already
assess foreign relations matters in other doctrinal contexts,249 and it is not clear
that they are necessarily incapable of doing so adequately in the context of
foreign state immunity decisionmaking.250 Moreover, in some – and perhaps
many – cases, the plaintiff’s suit may be subject to dismissal based on ordinary
principles of jurisdiction or forum non conveniens.251 In those cases, the
determination necessary for the proportionality approach could be made
without assessing the potential adverse foreign relations consequences of
allowing the suit to proceed in the forum state: the foreign state immunity
doctrine would be unnecessary to avoid such consequences because the suit
would be dismissed on other grounds.252 This first objection therefore has the
Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit argued that the doctrine should only apply to five
categories:
[There are] strictly political or public acts about which sovereigns have traditionally
been quite sensitive to which the doctrine should be limited: (1) internal administrative
acts, such as expulsion of an alien, (2) legislative acts, such as nationalization, (3) acts
concerning the armed forces, (4) acts concerning diplomatic activity, (5) public loans.
336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964). According to the court, the foreign state immunity
doctrine does not require “sacrificing the interests of private litigants to international comity
in other than these limited categories.” Id. The use of ex ante categories, however, is likely
to be a less accurate method than case-by-case analysis of foreign relations implications.
249 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727-28 (2004) (“Since many
attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for the violation of new norms of international
law would raise risks of adverse foreign policy consequences, they should be undertaken, if
at all, with great caution.”); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102,
115 (1987) (finding that the Court should “consider the procedural and substantive policies
of other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction by the [U.S.
federal or state] court”); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28
(1964) (recognizing that the “vitality [of the act of state doctrine] depends on its capacity to
reflect the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political branches of the
Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs”); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12
(1962) (discussing the significance of foreign relations considerations to judicial application
of the political question doctrine).
250 See Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 115 (Loucaides, J.,
dissenting) (“The courts should be in a position to weigh the competing interests in favour
of upholding an immunity or allowing a judicial determination of a civil right, after looking
into the subject matter of the proceedings.”).
251 For an overview of these and other court access doctrines of private international law,
see generally Fawcett, supra note 100, at 3-70.
252 See Donoghue, supra note 80, at 524-26 (1992) (arguing that before a court reaches
the issue of immunity, it should determine whether it has personal jurisdiction); R. Higgins,
Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity, 29 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 265, 27172 (1982) (asserting that immunity is an exception to jurisdiction and arguing that “[i]f there
is no jurisdiction, then there is no need to establish immunity” because “competence is the
sine qua non of immunity”); see also BADR, supra note 28, at 80 (“[R]ecognition of
jurisdictional immunity [is not required] for foreign states as a means of respecting their
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most force in cases where the forum state has jurisdiction and would be unable
to decline its authority to exercise it based on other doctrines, but less force in
other cases.
A second objection is that even in cases in which a grant of immunity would
not advance the foreign state immunity doctrine’s underlying functions, there
may be formal justifications for granting immunity.253 Critics have questioned
the doctrine’s formal justifications, however. For example, Oppenheim’s
International Law concludes that it is “doubtful” that the justifications of
sovereign equality, independence, and dignity of states provide a “satisfactory
basis” for the foreign state immunity doctrine:
There is no obvious impairment of the rights of equality, or
independence, or dignity of a state if it is subjected to ordinary judicial
processes within the territory of a foreign state – in particular if that state,
as appears to be the tendency in countries under the rule of law, submits
to the jurisdiction of its own courts in respect of claims brought against
it.254
The doctrine may have been justified in an earlier “era of personal
sovereignty, when kings could theoretically do no wrong and when the
exercise by one sovereign over another indicated hostility or superiority” – but

sovereignty or upholding their dignity. Governmental acts which constitute a true exercise
of sovereignty . . . cannot have any extra-territorial effects. Their force is, by their very
nature, limited to the territory of the state itself and it is with that state alone that they have
substantial contact. Lack of nexus would result in denying jurisdiction with regard to them
to the courts of other states as a matter of primary lack of jurisdiction and not as a matter of
immunity from jurisdiction.”); Garnett, supra note 58, at 186 (arguing that private
international law rules would bar most objectionable claims against foreign states, and that
immunity rules are therefore largely superfluous). In the current Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, specifications of the requisite connections to U.S. territory are “scattered
throughout the substantive immunity provisions.” DELLAPENNA, supra note 166, at 171.
Moreover, it is not yet settled whether foreign states enjoy the protections of the U.S.
Constitution’s Due Process Clause for purposes of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 182. This
may make it difficult for U.S. courts to separate the immunity inquiry from the jurisdictional
inquiry.
253 See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the doctrine’s formal justifications).
254 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 14, § 109, at 342; see also FOX, supra
note 5, at 62 (arguing that “[i]f [equality] means equality with the forum State when the
latter is placed in the position of defendant State in municipal proceedings brought in
another State, it would seem more an argument against discrimination” than for immunity);
id. at 63 (“It is more in keeping with the dignity of a foreign sovereign to submit himself to
the rule of law than to claim to be above it . . . .” (quoting Rahimtoola v. Nizam of
Hyderabad, [1958] A.C. 379 (H.L.) 418 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Denning,
dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lauterpacht, supra note 59, at 231 (rejecting
the argument that foreign state immunity is necessary to protect the dignity of the foreign
state).
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that era, so the argument goes, has passed.255 We are now in an era of legal
accountability of states, and such accountability is inconsistent with
immunity.256 As Eli Lauterpacht subtly puts it, “exemption from legal process
is not congenial to the climate of the modern State.”257
Moreover, because these formal justifications were developed in the statecentric era of international law, before legalization of the right to court access,
those justifications lack a theory for why immunity should trump court
access.258 Absent such a theory, the formal justifications are weak when they
confront the right to court access. Nevertheless, formal justifications continue
to be invoked, including by the ICJ.259 Objections based on formal
justifications therefore have significant influence even if they are not
particularly convincing on the merits.
A third objection to the proportionality approach is based on a critique of
balancing and proportionality tests in general.260 According to this critique,
balancing leads to a “complete erosion” of individual rights because “[i]t
overlooks the idea that human rights are not merely quantities of freedom but
protect some basic status of people as moral agents.”261 From this perspective,
balancing court access against foreign-relations benefits risks trivializing the
right of court access.262
255

Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336
F.2d 354, 357 (2d Cir. 1964).
256 See George A. Bermann, Immunity and Accountability: Is the Balance Shifting?, 99
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 227, 227 (2005) (arguing that “[t]he accountability of states and
state actors on the international scene is on a forward march” but that greater accountability
probably cannot be achieved “unless the contours of the immunities to which they are
subject are seriously thought through”); cf. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
631 (5th ed. 2007) (explaining that one critique of immunity at the domestic level is that it is
inconsistent with the central maxim that “no one, not even the government, is above the
law”).
257 E. Lauterpacht, Fellow, Trinity College, The Codification of the Law of Diplomatic
Immunity, Address Before the Grotius Society (Feb. 3, 1954), in 40 TRANSACTIONS
GROTIUS SOC’Y 65, 71 (1954).
258 Cf. Bermann, supra note 256, at 235 (“At a period in which in enlightened
communities the securing of the rights of the individual, in all their aspects, against the state
has become a matter of special and significant effort, there is no longer a disposition to
tolerate the injustice which may arise whenever the state – our own state or a foreign state –
screens itself behind the shield of immunity in order to defeat a legitimate claim.”).
259 See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 15, para. 57 (finding the
derivation of foreign state immunity from the principle of sovereign equality).
260 See generally AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
THEIR LIMITATIONS (2012) (investigating defenses and critiques of proportionality tests in
constitutional-rights adjudication).
261 Stavros Tsakyrakis, Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?, 7 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 468, 490 (2009).
262 Others, however, argue that proportionality and balancing “are the most sophisticated
means to solve the very complex and intricate collision of human rights with competing
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The alternatives to some form of balancing, however, are likely to be
undesirable, unrealistic, or both. As discussed above, the ICJ’s and the
ECHR’s approaches categorically prioritize the customary international law of
foreign state immunity over the right to court access.263 At the other end of the
spectrum, some scholars argue that the foreign state immunity doctrine should
be abolished in order to protect the right to court access.264 But in some cases,
a grant of immunity may genuinely advance the foreign state immunity
doctrine’s core justifying function of facilitating foreign relations, without
imposing substantial court access costs (for example, if a third state or the
foreign state would provide meaningful court access).265 In such cases, foreign
state immunity would seem less objectionable. In any event, even though some
scholars question the foreign state immunity doctrine’s status as a rule of
customary international law,266 its status as such is so widely accepted that its
abolition would seem highly unlikely any time in the foreseeable future.
C.

A Strategy for Change

The proportionality approach has the important attraction of seeking to
preserve the core foreign relations function of the foreign state immunity
doctrine while taking seriously the importance of court access. But even if the
objections against it are adequately addressed, the prospects for its adoption

principles” and that “[r]ights adjudication must necessarily rely on balancing.” Matthias
Klatt & Moritz Meister, Proportionality – A Benefit to Human Rights?: Remarks on the ICON Controversy, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 687, 708 (2012).
263 See supra Part IV.A.
264 See, e.g., BANKAS, supra note 80, at 364 (“In order to promote a balance of justice, it
is submitted de lege ferenda that the doctrine of restrictive immunity be forsaken or
abandoned entirely . . . .”); RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 139-45, 169 (1964) (presenting arguments against foreign
state immunity and concluding that it lacks “an adequate functional justification”); Garnett,
supra note 58, at 190 (“[F]oreign state immunity should be abolished.”); Lauterpacht, supra
note 59, at 237 (arguing for “the abolition, subject to specified safeguards and exceptions, of
the rule of immunity of foreign states”); Sciso, supra note 89, at 1201, 1214-15 (defending
the Italian position that the foreign state immunity doctrine does not apply to alleged
violations of jus cogens rules of international law). See generally Victory Transp. Inc. v.
Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 357 (2d Cir. 1964)
(“[T]he wisdom of retaining the [foreign state immunity] doctrine has been cogently
questioned.”); FOX, supra note 5, at 737-39 (discussing calls for the “total abolition” of
foreign state immunity).
265 See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the doctrine’s functional justifications); cf. David P.
Stewart, Immunity and Accountability: More Continuity than Change?, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L. PROC. 227, 228 (2005) (describing critiques of immunity, then suggesting that “[i]t is
worth remembering that there is a point and a purpose to immunity,” namely “functionality
and reciprocity”).
266 See supra Part I.B (discussing the status of the foreign state immunity doctrine as
customary international law).
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are dim in the short term. As discussed above, the ECHR and the ICJ have
indicated that unless status quo customary international law permits a denial of
foreign state immunity, immunity must be granted – regardless of the court
access consequences. And the process of customary international legal change
is ordinarily slow and difficult.267
Customary international law is based on widespread state practice out of a
sense of legal obligation.268 Once a rule of customary international law is
established, it generally is binding on all states.269 For a different rule of
customary international law to emerge, states would have to engage in a
different practice; yet the necessary new state practice may be legally barred
by the established rule of customary international law. This paradox explains
the “stickiness” of customary international law.270 In the case of foreign state
immunity, this stickiness is reinforced by the recent decisions of the ICJ and
the ECHR which, by prioritizing immunity over court access, make it
especially unlikely that national courts will deviate from that approach – at
least not on a widespread basis.271 And if these recent decisions make it
unlikely that state practice will change, it is also unlikely that in later decisions
the ICJ or the ECHR will find that the foreign state immunity doctrine has
changed.272
Therefore, although the proportionality approach (or another alternative to
the status quo customary international law of foreign state immunity) may be
worth pursuing, a longer term strategy is needed. One such strategy would aim

267 See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120
YALE L.J. 202, 245 (2010) (explaining that it is hard to change established rules of
customary international law).
268 CASSESE, supra note 56, at 156 (“[C]ustom is made up of two elements: general
practice . . . and the conviction that such practice reflects, or amounts to, law . . . .”).
269 A widely recognized exception to this general rule is that a state that persistently
objects to a rule of customary international law before the rule is established is not bound by
that rule. See id. at 162-63 (discussing this exception but concluding that “custom at present
no longer maintains its original ‘consensual’ features”).
270 See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 267, at 245 (borrowing the term from contract
theory). See generally Suzanne Katzenstein, International Adjudication and Custom
Breaking by Domestic Courts, 62 DUKE L.J. 671 (2012).
271 See Roger O’Keefe, State Immunity and Human Rights: Heads and Walls, Hearts and
Minds, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 999, 1017 (2011) (describing this barrier to changing the
foreign state immunity doctrine).
272 See id. (describing this as a “customary international legal feedback loop”); see also
Katzenstein, supra note 270, at 696 (“[T]he ICJ’s invalidation of the Italian deviation may
have the substantive effect of entrenching the existing sovereign immunity rule.”). But see
Sangeeta Shah, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State: Germany v. Italy, 12 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 555, 555 (2012) (expressing the pessimistic view that the ICJ “appears to have
hammered the final nail in the coffin on the possibility that a state can be sued for serious
violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law in the national
courts of another state” (footnote omitted)).
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to change customary international law through changing state practice. As
Shaw puts it, “[b]ehaviour contrary to a custom contains within itself the seeds
of a new rule.”273 Such behavior, however, will not help establish the state
practice and opinio juris needed for a new rule unless other states endorse or at
least acquiesce in the new practice.274 Therefore, for this strategy to succeed,
national courts would need to identify opportunities to apply the new approach
where the foreign state would provide such endorsement or acquiescence.275 If
the new practice is increasingly accepted over time, a new rule of customary
international law may emerge.276 If the legalization of the right to court access
continues to advance, states may be more likely to engage or acquiesce in the
new practice out of a sense of legal obligation. This would be an ambitious
strategy. Deviations from the absolute theory of foreign state immunity,
however, ultimately led to the prevailing view that customary international law
now recognizes the restrictive theory instead, thus suggesting that this strategy
is plausible over the long term.277
Another strategy would aim to override customary international law by
treaty.278 In the most recent attempts to codify the customary international law
of foreign state immunity in treaty form, the drafters decided not to pursue
incorporating an exception for serious human rights violations because of
concerns that doing so would preclude agreement on an overall text.279 Thus, it
273

SHAW, supra note 29, at 91.
See HIGGINS, supra note 61, at 22 (“A new norm cannot emerge without both practice
and opinio juris; and an existing norm does not die without the great majority of states
engaging in both a contrary practice and withdrawing their opinio juris.”); Bradley &
Gulati, supra note 267, at 212 (“The only way for nations to change a rule of [customary
international law] . . . is to violate the rule and hope that other nations accept the new
practice.”).
275 Cf. Katzenstein, supra note 270, at 673-74 (arguing that among the requirements for
“custom breaking” to lead to customary international legal change, courts must overcome or
circumvent political opposition and survive or avoid judicial review).
276 See CASSESE, supra note 56, at 157 (“If [a new practice] does not encounter strong
and consistent opposition from other States but is increasingly accepted, or acquiesced in, a
customary rule gradually crystallizes.”).
277 See supra Part I.B (describing the shift from absolute to restrictive immunity). But see
Bradley & Gulati, supra note 267, at 232 (arguing that it makes more sense to understand
the shift not as a result of custom-breaking and acquiescence, but rather as the withdrawal of
an increasing number of states from the customary rule of absolute immunity and their
parallel new practice of restrictive immunity).
278 See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 267, at 211 (“It is accepted that a [customary
international law] rule can be overridden by a later-in-time treaty, but only as between the
parties to the treaty.”).
279 See Gerhard Hafner, Accountability and Immunity: The United Nations Convention
on Jurisdictional Immunity of States and Their Property and the Accountability of States, 99
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 237, 242 (2005) (stating that “[t]he ILC discussed this issue, but
was unable to recognize a generally accepted position in this regard” and that “it became
clear during the negotiations that the inclusion of such a restriction on immunity in the
274
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seems that in the short term, the treaty strategy would be unlikely to succeed. If
the right to court access continues to develop and be embraced by states,
individuals, and advocacy organizations over time, however, the political
preconditions for the treaty strategy may develop.280
This suggests a complementary strategy: advocacy aimed not so much at the
foreign state immunity doctrine as such, but rather at promoting the right to
court access and advancing its legalization. The more firmly that customary
international law establishes the right to court access, the more difficult it will
be for courts to avoid working through the tension between foreign state
immunity and the right to court access. In Germany v. Italy, the ICJ argued that
there was no conflict between jus cogens norms and the foreign state immunity
doctrine because the former is substantive and the latter is procedural.281 But if
court access becomes a recognized right under customary international law,
then this formalistic logic would fail because court access and immunity are
both procedural. Moreover, treaty interpretation methods, such as those used
by the ECHR in the Al-Adsani line of cases to conform the European
Convention to foreign state immunity, could not be used to prioritize immunity
because, like immunity, the source of the right to court access would be
customary international law.
CONCLUSION
The foreign state immunity doctrine is well established as a doctrine of
customary international law.282 Meanwhile, the right to court access has
become widely accepted and is increasingly legalized.283 Therefore, one
important factor to consider when normatively evaluating the foreign state
immunity doctrine is its impact on court access.
Using a combination of doctrinal analysis and empirical analysis, this
Article has demonstrated that the foreign state immunity doctrine has a serious
impact on court access. U.S. courts frequently dismiss suits on foreign state
Convention would have precluded any possibility of achieving a broadly acceptable text”).
Indeed, in its recent Germany v. Italy opinion, the ICJ noted that the relevant working group
decided not to take up the matter of a human rights exception because “‘it did not seem to be
ripe enough for the Working Group to engage in a codification exercise over it’” and the ICJ
on that basis considered that “at the time of adoption of the United Nations Convention in
2004, States did not consider that customary international law limited immunity in the
manner now suggested by Italy.” Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 15, para.
89 (quoting Report of the Chairman of the Working Group on the Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, Int’l Law Comm’n, 54th Sess., para.
47, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/54/L.12) (internal quotation marks omitted).
280 Cf. Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336
F.2d 354, 357 (2d Cir. 1964) (observing that “[g]rowing concern for individual rights and
public morality” led to erosion of absolute theory of foreign state immunity).
281 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 15, para. 93.
282 See supra Part I.B.
283 See supra Part II.
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immunity grounds. They often do so even when the foreign state’s courts are
unlikely to provide meaningful court access. In such cases, the foreign state
immunity doctrine may deny a claimant court access altogether.
To mitigate the tension between the foreign state immunity doctrine and the
right to court access, this Article has proposed a proportionality approach.
According to this approach, foreign state immunity should not be granted if
doing so would have an impact on the claimant’s ability to obtain court access
that would be disproportionate to the benefits of immunity for relations
between the forum state and the foreign state. Otherwise, the foreign state
immunity doctrine, including recognized exceptions to immunity, would apply
normally. This approach is subject to significant objections. But the proposal’s
wager is that its disadvantages are outweighed by an important advantage:
unlike the status quo approach, and unlike proposals to eliminate the foreign
state immunity doctrine altogether, the proportionality approach takes seriously
both the doctrine’s underlying foreign relations function and the right to court
access.
As this Article has acknowledged, the short-term prospects for changing the
foreign state immunity doctrine are not encouraging. Therefore, a longer term
strategy is needed – one aimed at changing the status quo customary
international law of foreign state immunity or overriding it by treaty, and
aimed at promoting the acceptance and legalization of the right to court access.
In his separate opinion in Germany v. Italy, Judge Kenneth Keith noted that
issues of immunity “have changed over time and no doubt will continue to
change, in the direction of a narrowing of immunity.”284 And as Hazel Fox has
argued, the foreign state immunity doctrine may be entering a “post-modern
phase, where immunity may be rendered unnecessary or detached from the
State.”285 As the doctrine develops – as it moves toward its post-modern phase
– it should take into account its court access consequences and find ways to
continue to perform its core foreign relations function while minimizing its
impact on court access.

284 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), para. 3 (Feb. 3, 2012) (separate
opinion of Judge Keith), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16887.pdf.
285 FOX, supra note 5, at 2.
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